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Restrictions On Corporate Spending On
State Ballot Measure Campaigns: A
Re-Evaluation of Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce
by SusAN W. DANA*
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce adopted a new theory that allowed states to regulate
independent expenditures by corporations in connection with candi-
date campaigns.' This new theory held that corporations by definition
have the potential to corrupt the political process, because special
state-conferred advantages allow them to accumulate massive eco-
nomic resources which can then be used in the political marketplace
without correlation to public support for the corporation's political
position. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, it is constitu-
tional under the First Amendment to prohibit corporations from using
their general treasury funds expressly to advocate support for, or op-
position to, a candidate for political office. Corporations may, how-
ever, establish and administer separate segregated funds, also called
political action committees, the purpose of which is to engage in such
political speech, as long as contributions to the segregated fund are
solicited only from shareholders, employees and members of the cor-
poration. In other words, a corporation may not contribute money
from its general treasury to the segregated fund, although the corpora-
tion may spend such monies on the establishment and administration
of the fund.
The State of Montana recently tried, through a popular initiative
("1-125"), to extend the Austin approach to corporate spending on
* Assistant Professor, Montana State University College of Business. J.D., Stanford
Law School, 1989; B.A., Brown University, 1985.
1. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990). Limi-
tations on contributions to candidates, as opposed to independent expenditures on behalf
of candidates, have been constitutional since the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See infra Part I.A, for a discussion of Buckley and the distinction
between expenditures and contributions.
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ballot measure campaigns.2 Although the initiative was approved by
the voters of Montana in 1996, it was declared unconstitutional by a
federal district court two years later on the grounds that the Supreme
Court has not permitted such regulation of speech on ballot measure
campaigns.3 The case has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit,4 and is
likely to be appealed to the Supreme Court regardless of the Ninth
Circuit's decision. In the meantime, the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group and citizen groups around the country are hoping to use Mon-
tana's law as a model for similar laws in other states.'
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Austin applied only to
corporate spending in connection with candidate campaigns, and al-
though the Court has never approved any government-imposed re-
strictions on expenditures in connection with ballot measure
campaigns, Austin's theory is so broad that it must necessarily reach
corporate spending on ballot issues. The extension of Austin to ballot
issues could have a significant impact on states' initiative and referen-
dum processes. As of 1999, 27 states provided for some form of initia-
tive or popular referendum process and 49 permitted legislative
referenda.6 In the November 1998 elections, voters in 44 states were
asked to decide on a total of 235 statewide ballot questions.7 Because
of the frequent state use of ballot measures, the opportunity for cor-
porate participation in law-making is enormous, as is the potential for
distortion of the democratic process.8 Therefore, the question of
2. The terms "ballot measure," "ballot issue," "ballot question," and "initiative and
referendum" are used interchangeably in this article to refer to any type of proposed law
that is placed on a state ballot and requires a public vote. Generally speaking, an initiative
is a proposed law placed on the ballot by citizens, whereas a referendum is placed on the
ballot by state legislatures. See Initiative & Referendum Institute Factsheet #1 (visited Mar.
12, 2000) <http:lwww.iandrinstitute.orglfactsheets/fslcontent.htm>.
3. See Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 28 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (D.
Mont. 1998).
4. See Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, C.A. No. 98-36256 (9th Cir.).
5. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Mot, attorney for 1-125 Proponents' Com-
mittee (July 23, 1999). A petition for an initiative similar to 1-125 has been certified for
circulation in Oregon, (visited Mar. 12, 2000) <http://www.ballotwatch.org/asp/
fulldescription.asp?id=253>, and citizen groups in approximately 15 other states, includ-
ing California, have also expressed interest in placing initiatives like 1-125 on their state
ballots. See id.
6. See Initiative & Referendum Institute Factsheet #1 (visited Mar. 12, 2000) <http://
www.iandrinstitute.org/factsheets/fslcontent.htm>.
7. See Initiative and Referendum Institute, Initiatives, and Referendum on the 1998
Ballot Report Summary (visited Mar. 12, 2000) <http://www.iandrinstitute.org/98post.htm>.
Of the 235 questions, there were 55 initiatives, 6 popular referenda and 174 legislative
referenda. See id.
8. See generally, David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initi-
ative and Referendum Process, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 13 (1995).
whether states can constitutionally regulate corporate political spend-
ing on ballot issues is becoming increasingly significant.
This article argues that although the Austin theory should logi-
cally extend to ballot measure campaigns, the theory is in-considered
and cannot constitutionally support the segregated fund requirement
for corporate political spending. Government regulation of political
speech9 is constitutional only if the regulation serves a compelling or
sufficiently important" state interest and is narrowly tailored to pro-
tect that interest. Austin, however, fails clearly to define the state in-
terest involved in the regulation of corporate political spending.
Moreover, the segregated fund requirement permitted by Austin is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect the state's asserted interest.
Perhaps huge corporate expenditures on candidate elections and bal-
9. The U.S. Supreme Court has equated spending with speech. See, e.g., Austin, 494
U.S. at 657 (1990) ("Certainly, the use of funds to support a political candidate is
'speech"'). Nevertheless, there is some disagreement among the current justices over
whether money equals speech. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, __ U.S.
-, 120 S.Ct. 897, 910 (2000), Stevens, J., concurring (stating that "[m]oney is property; it
is not speech," but going on to state that use of money to fund speech by others merits
significant constitutional protection); id. at 911, Breyer, J., concurring ("a decision to con-
tribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern-not because money
is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech"); but see id. at n.4, Thomas, J., dissent-
ing (Justice Stevens' propositions "are directly contradicted by many of our precedents").
There is also debate among commentators over whether spending equals speech for pur-
poses of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corrup-
tion, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 Gno. L.J. 45, 52 (1997) (money is speech); J.
Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005,
1009-10 (1976) (money does not necessarily equal speech, although the two are closely
related); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Cam-
paign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1281, 1290 (1994) (spending money on political speech should be protected by First
Amendment). This article follows the U.S. Supreme Court's lead in assuming that political
spending equals political speech.
10. Until recently, it seemed clear that a compelling state interest is required to justify
government regulation of political speech. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("[w]hen a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting
scrutiny"'); Smith, supra note 9, at 52 ("strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of judicial
review for campaign finance regulation"). The Supreme Court recently drew a distinction,
however, between the standard of review for limitations on contributions to candidates and
expenditures on behalf of candidates. While expenditures are still subject to strict scrutiny,
limitations on contributions must merely be "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently im-
portant interest." Nixon, 120 S.Ct. at 899. Justices Thomas and Scalia criticized this stan-
dard, arguing that "[t]he Court in Buckley at least purported to employ a test of 'closest
scrutiny.' ... The Court today abandons even that pretense and reviews contributions
under the sui generis 'Buckley's standard of scrutiny'.... Apart from its endorsement of
Buckley's rejection of the intermediate standards of review... the Court makes no effort
to justify its deviation from the tests we traditionally employ in free speech cases." Id. at
922, Thomas, J., dissenting.
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lot issue campaigns are corrupting the political process and undermin-
ing public confidence in democracy, 1 but the Austin theory is neither
constitutional nor is it good policy. Therefore, this article argues that
the Supreme Court should reconsider Austin and develop a different
theory for determining whether corporate political speech corrupts
the democratic process and undermines public confidence in the polit-
ical system.
Part I of this article reviews Supreme Court jurisprudence on cor-
porate political speech cases, culminating in Austin v. Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce. Part II describes the Montana initiative that sought
to extend Austin to ballot measure campaigns, and discusses the re-
sulting law suits and their current status. Part III shows that the Aus-
tin theory of corruption must also logically be extended to ballot issue
campaigns, but Part IV argues that Austin's theory is unconstitutional
with respect to both candidate and ballot question campaigns because
(a) the segregated fund requirement is a significant burden on consti-
tutionally protected speech, (b) the alleged state interest is poorly de-
fined, and (c) the segregated fund law is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored. Specifically, Part IV shows that although the Austin Court
attempts to justify the segregated fund requirement on grounds that
corporations receive special state-conferred advantages that allow
them to amass "war-chests" that can then be spent on political speech,
in fact these alleged advantages are also available to non-corporate
entities and therefore can not support Austin's or Montana's attempt
to regulate corporate political spending. Finally, the article concludes
that the Court should abandon Austin and instead create a new theory
for determining whether well-funded political speech, corporate or
otherwise, can constitutionally be regulated in the context of both can-
didate elections and ballot measure campaigns.
I. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Corporate
Political Speech
Although attempts to regulate corporate spending on political
campaigns in the United States date back at least 100 years,'2 it was
not until after the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
11. See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary,
11 YALE L. & PoL'Y Rev. 273 (1993); John S. Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign
Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence
Be Found?, 29 UNIV. MAMI L. Rlv. 377 (1985).
12. For a detailed history of the regulation of corporate spending on political cam-
paigns, see United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
1971 ("FECA")1 3 that the Supreme Court began seriously to consider
the constitutional issues associated with such regulation. In the 1957
case United States v. United Auto Workers, the Court declined to con-
sider the constitutional issues raised by a prohibition on labor union
contributions or expenditures in connection with a candidate election,
focusing instead on statutory interpretation of the prohibition. 4 Simi-
larly, in the 1972 case Pipefitters v. United States, the Court again
avoided the constitutional question in favor of statutory interpretation
when it found that the same statute it had considered in Auto Workers
allowed a union to create a political action committee controlled by
the union, as long as union members' contributions to the committee
were truly voluntary.' 5
However, starting in 1976 the Court began to consider the consti-
tutionality of regulations on political spending on numerous occasions.
This series of decisions began with Buckley v. Valeo,' 6 which consid-
ered the constitutionality of limits on contributions and expenditures
in connection with federal candidate campaigns. For purposes of this
article, the next two important cases were First National Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellottil7 and Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley,'" both
of which addressed expenditure limits on ballot issue campaigns. Sub-
sequently came a series of cases involving the constitutionality of
prohibiting corporations and unions from spending money out of their
general treasuries on candidate campaigns.' 9 These cases together
form the context for an analysis of Montana's attempt through 1-125
to push the bounds of current Supreme Court jurisprudence to permit
state regulation of corporate spending on ballot issue campaigns.
A. Buckley v. Valeo
The key case on which all subsequent political campaign spending
cases rest is Buckley v. Valeo.20 Buckley considered the constitutional-
ity of the FECA,21 which, among other provisions, "includes restric-
13. See Pub. L. No. 92-2252, 86 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq.
(1997 & 1999 Supp.)).
14. See United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 591 (1957).
15. See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401 (1972).'
16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
17. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
18. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
19. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm'n., 459 U.S. 197
(1982); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986); Austin, 494 U.S. at 652.
20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
21. 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1997 & Supp. 1999).
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tions on political contributions and expenditures that apply broadly to
all phases of and all participants in the election process."'2 Although
the case focused exclusively on campaign funding issues for federal
candidates, and did not address funding of ballot issues, Buckley es-
tablished the parameters of the debate on political funding questions.
Buckley began with the premise that "discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the oper-
ation of the system of government established by our Constitution.
The First Amendment affords the broadest possible protection to such
political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people."" Despite the importance of the First Amendment to
the political process, however, Buckley held that the State may burden
free speech rights if the State does so to protect a "sufficiently impor-
tant interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgement of" First Amendment rights.24
The Court then went on to distinguish, in its constitutional analy-
sis, between limitations on contributions to candidates and limitations
on expenditures made on behalf of candidates, finding that limitations
on contributions constituted much smaller restrictions on political ex-
pression than did limitations on expenditures.25 The Court held that
the government has a compelling state interest in limiting contribu-
tions to candidates in order to prevent corruption, or the appearance
of corruption, in the political process:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure politi-
cal quid pro quo's from current and potential office holders, the
integrity of our system of representative democracy is under-
mined.... Of almost equal concern ... is the impact of the
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of
the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individ-
ual financial contributions.... Congress could legitimately con-
clude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper
influence "is also critical.., if confidence in the system of repre-
sentative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent."
26
22. Buckley, 424 U.S at 12-13.
23. Id. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). See also id. at
49, n.55 ("Democracy depends on a well-informed electorate, not a citizenry legislatively
limited in its ability to discuss and debate candidates and issues.").
24. Id. at 25.
25. See id. at 19-20.
26. Id. at 26-27 (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
Accordingly, the Court concluded that FECA's limitations on
contributions to candidates for federal office were constitutional be-
cause they were narrowly drawn to address a compelling state interest.
The Court was less comfortable with FECA's limitations on ex-
penditures on behalf of candidates. The Court found that the govern-
ment's interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption was inadequate to justify FECA's limitations on expendi-
tures because "the independent advocacy restricted by the provision
does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corrup-
tion comparable to those identified with large campaign contribu-
tions."' 7 The Court expressly rejected the government's argument
that the expenditure limitations were necessary to equalize the politi-
cal influence of individuals and groups:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was de-
signed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources," and "to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of politi-
cal and social changes desired by the people."
The First Amendment's protection against governmental abridg-
ment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a per-
son's financial ability to engage in public discussion. 8
Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures, its
characterization of the type of corruption that justifies regulation of
political speech, and its refusal to find a compelling state interest in
equalizing political influence have formed the foundation of all subse-
quent attempts to regulate political speech.29
B. Ballot Measure Cases
The Supreme Court has only twice considered the constitutional-
ity of limitations on expenditures in connection with ballot measure
campaigns, and in both cases has found such regulations to be uncon-
stitutional. However, because both cases were decided before Austin
27. 1d at 46. The Court also found that the limitations on expenditures did not suffi-
ciently address the state's interest because the limitations applied only to expenditures that
explicitly advocate the election or defeat of a particular candidate, but not to expenditures
that simply promote a candidate. See id. at 45. The Court itself had made this distinction
in order to avoid problems of constitutional vagueness. See id at 44.
28. Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted).
29. Several Supreme Court justices have recently questioned the continuing validity of
Buckley. See Nixon, 120 S.Ct. 897, (Kennedy, J., dissenting, Part. II) (Thomas, J. & Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, they many no longer represent
the Court's final position on ballot-issue campaign funding.
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,30 the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corpo-
rations from making contributions or expenditures "for the purpose
of... influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to
the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property,
business or assets of the corporation."' 31 The statute further provided
that any ballot issue concerning income tax was by definition not an
issue that materially affected the property, business or assets of a cor-
poration.32 The plaintiffs in Bellotti were two banking associations
and three business corporations that wanted to publicize their views
on a proposed constitutional amendment that would have allowed
the Massachusetts legislature to impose an income tax on individuals,
and which was to be submitted to the voters as a ballot question at a
general election.33 The plaintiffs sued to have the Massachusetts
statute prohibiting expenditures for such a purpose declared
unconstitutional.34
The Court framed the issue as whether the Massachusetts statute
"abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to pro-
tect."'35 Put another way, the Court stated that the question in the
case, "simply put, is whether the corporate identity of the speaker de-
prives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear [First
Amendment] entitlement to protection. '3 6 The Court held that it did,
and thus found the statute to be unconstitutional.
37
The Court began its analysis by pointing out that the kind of
speech in which the plaintiff corporations sought to engage is "at the
heart of the First Amendment's protection. 3 8 Furthermore,
[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one would sug-
gest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the
type of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy,
and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corpo-
ration rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the
30. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
31. Id. at 768.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 767-69.
34. See id. at 769.
35. Id. at 776. The Court explicitly refused to consider the separate question of
whether corporations have First Amendment rights. See id.
36. Id. at 778.
37. See id. at 795.
38. Id. at 776.
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speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, as-
sociation, union, or individual.39
Thus, the role of the First Amendment is not only to foster indi-
vidual self-expression, but also to afford "the public access to discus-
sion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas."''
Having decided that corporate speech on ballot issues is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the Court proceeded to determine
whether the Massachusetts statute was nevertheless constitutional be-
cause it served a compelling state interest and was sufficiently nar-
rowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of the First
Amendment.4 Massachusetts asserted two compelling state interests.
First was "the State's interest in sustaining the active role of the indi-
vidual citizen in the electoral process and thereby preventing the dimi-
nution of the citizen's confidence in government."'42 Second was "the
interest in protecting the rights of shareholders whose views differ
from those expressed by management on behalf of the corporation."'43
The Court rejected both asserted interests as not being served by the
statute.
Addressing Massachusetts' first argument, the Court acknowl-
edged that in the context of campaigns by candidates for elected of-
fice, there is a threat of real or apparent corruption because of the
possibility of a political quid pro quo, and agreed with Massachusetts
that preventing corruption and preserving individual citizens' confi-
dence in government are interests "of the highest importance."'
However, the Court found that
[r]eferenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office.
The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving elections,
simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue. To be
sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the
vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may
persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it .... 45
The Court also rejected Massachusetts' argument that "corpora-
tions are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out other
points of view,"46 because, according to the Court, there was "no
39. 1& at 777 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 783.
41. See id. at 786.
42. Id- at 787.
43. Id
44. Id at 788-89, n. 26.
45. I& at 790 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 789.
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showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelm-
ing or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or
that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in
government."47 Importantly, the Court left the door ajar on this point
stating that if Massachusetts' "argument were supported by record or
legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to
undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than
serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our
consideration."48 The Court did not indicate what kind of evidence
would be sufficient to make the required showing.4"
The Court also rejected as sufficient grounds for the statute Mas-
sachusetts' asserted government interest in protecting corporate
shareholders from having their money used by the corporation to ex-
press views on ballot issues with which the shareholders might disa-
gree. Although the Court agreed that this interest is "both legitimate
and traditionally within the province of state law,"50 the Court found
that the Massachusetts statute did not sufficiently address this concern
because the statute was both under and overinclusive. The statute was
underinclusive because it prohibited corporations from making ex-
penditures in connection with ballot measures, but not with respect to
the support or defeat of other legislation. In addition, the statute pro-
hibited only banks and corporations from engaging in the proscribed
speech, but not other kinds of organizations that "have resources com-
47. Id. at 789-90 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 789.
49. It is still not clear what kind of evidence is needed to prove corruption of the
political process, although the Court recently opined that "[t]he quantum of empirical
evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised." Nixon, 120 S.Ct. at
900. Justice White, in his Bellotti dissent, pointed out that there was significant evidence in
the record indicating the effect of corporate spending on ballot issues. See First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 810-11 (1978). He noted that in 1972, an "organized
political committee" raised and expended approximately $120,000 to defeat a proposed
amendment to the Massachusetts constitution, while the only political committee organ-
ized to support the amendment raised only $7,000. See id. at 811. In a 1976 California
referendum campaign, 203 corporations contributed $2,530,000 in opposition to the refer-
endum, while supporters raised only $1,600,000. See id. at 811 n.11. Justice White also
noted that in Montana in 1976, corporate opponents of a referendum raised $144,000,
while supporters raised only $451. In each case, the corporate interests won. See id. at 811
& n.11.
50. Belloti, 435 U.S. at 792.
parable to those of large corporations" and whose members have in-
terests similar to shareholders."
The Court also deemed the Massachusetts statute to be overinclu-
sive because it would prohibit corporate political speech on ballot
questions even when the shareholders unanimously supported the cor-
poration's position.5 2 Without deciding whether the protection of
shareholders is a "compelling" state interest, the Court noted that
shareholders can protect their own interests either by electing a board
that represents their views, or by bringing derivative suits to challenge
allegedly improper expenditures by management.53
The only other Supreme Court case on ballot issues is Citizens
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley.54 In that case, a Berkeley, Califor-
nia city ordinance limited contributions by a person to committees
formed to support or oppose local ballot measures to $250. The Su-
preme Court found the limitation to be unconstitutional, emphasizing,
as it did in Bellotti, that contributions to ballot issue campaigns do not
have the same potential to corrupt as do contributions to individual
candidates.5
It is thus clear from Bellotti that an outright prohibition on corpo-
rate contributions and expenditures in connection with a ballot issue is
unconstitutional unless the "argument[ ] were supported by record or
legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to
undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than
serving First Amendment interests .... "I It is also clear from Berke-
51. Id at 793. The Court apparently believed that Massachusetts' proffered interest in
protecting shareholders was merely a pretext for "silencing corporations on a particular
subject." Id
52. See id. at 794.
53. Iad at 795.
54. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
55. See id. at 297-98. See also concurrence by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, id. at
302. Justice White dissented from the Court's decision in Berkeley, and, as in Bellotti, he
included in his dissent figures that he argued may show that "the relative voice of corpora-
tions ha[d] been overwhelming [and] ... significant in influencing referenda." 454 U.S. at
306, quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90. According to Justice White, "[s]taggering dispari-
ties have developed between spending for and against various ballot measures." [footnote
omitted]. Id. at 307-08. While it is not possible to prove that heavy spending 'bought' a
victory on any particular ballot proposition, there is increasing evidence that large contrib-
utors are at least able to block the adoption of measures through the initiative process
[footnote omitted]." Id at 307-08. Justice White included evidence showing corporate
spending for and against ballot issues far exceeding spending by those on the opposite side
of the measure, and showing that when corporations oppose a ballot measure, they far
outspend those supporting the measure and successfully defeat such measures in almost all
cases. See id at 307-08 nn.2-4.
56. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 789.
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ley that a quid pro quo corruption theory is unlikely to satisfy the
evidentiary standard set by the Court for ballot measures and there-
fore can not sustain regulation of political spending on ballot measure
campaigns.
These cases are not dispositive of the constitutionality of Mon-
tana's 1-125, however, for two reasons. First, because Montana's 1-125
arguably does not constitute an outright prohibition on corporate po-
litical spending, but merely requires a corporation to use a separate,
segregated fund for such spending, it is distinguishable from the Mas-
sachusetts statute at issue in Bellotti. Second, the Supreme Court in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce moved away from Bellotti's
and Berkeley's focus on quid pro quo corruption as the basis for regu-
lation of corporate political spending and has opened the door for reg-
ulation of corporate spending on ballot measure campaigns regardless
of whether quid pro quo corruption has been shown. The following
two sections explain these issues further.
C. Segregated Fund Cases
The only Supreme Court cases to address the constitutionality of
requiring separate, segregated funds for corporate political activity, as
is required by Montana's 1-125, have occurred in the context of contri-
butions or expenditures on behalf of candidates for political office, not
for or against ballot measures. The Austin theory of corruption that
ultimately came out of these cases, however, is equally applicable to
ballot question campaigns. The cases are therefore highly relevant to
the constitutional analysis of attempts to regulate corporate spending
in connection with such campaigns.
The first important precursor to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce is the Court's discussion in Federal Election Commission v.
National Right to Work Committee (hereinafter "NRWC")57 of the
regulation of corporate and union contributions to political cam-
paigns. The issue in NRWC was whether the National Right to Work
Committee (hereinafter "NRWC") had violated Section 441(b) of
FECA,5 8 which requires corporations and unions that wish to make
contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections to
do so only through separate, segregated funds solicited from stock-
holders and members. The NRWC had solicited over 250,000 persons
for contributions to a separate segregated fund the purpose of which
was to support certain federal candidates for office. The FEC chal-
57. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
58. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1997 & Supp. 1999).
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lenged the NRWC's solicitation of so many people, arguing that not
all were actually "members" of the NRWC.59
While refusing to "attempt an exegesis of the statutory meaning
of the word "members" beyond that necessary to decide this case," 60
the Court concluded that the word "member" suggests "some rela-
tively enduring and independently significant financial or organiza-
tional attachment ... .,"61 Although NRWC called anyone who had
responded to the NRWC's past mass mailings a "member," neither
the NRWC's articles of incorporation nor its bylaws made any men-
tion of members, and the alleged "members" played no part in the
administration of the NRWC. 62 Under such circumstances, the Court
concluded that to define as a member anyone who had ever re-
sponded to an NRWC mailing would "open the door to all but unlim-
ited corporate solicitation and thereby render meaningless the
statutory limitation to 'members." 63
The Court defended its definition of "members" against the
lower court's concern that such a narrow definition would infringe
upon the constitutional right to free association.' 4 The Court found
that one of the state interests justifying the segregated fund require-
ment for corporations and unions was "to ensure that substantial ag-
gregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with
the corporate form of organization should not be converted into polit-
ical 'war chests' which could be used to incur political debts from leg-
islators who are aided by the contributions. ' 65 Apparently the Court
felt that if corporations and unions could solicit funds from anyone
who had ever expressed an interest in the organization, they would be
able to use their special attributes to accumulate funds that could then
59. See NRWC, 459 U.S. at 200-01.
60. Id. at 203.
61. hd at 204; cf Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 242 n.1 (stating that NRWC held that a "member" of a nonstock corporation
must have "some relatively enduring and independently significant financial or organiza-
tional attachment" to the corporation).
62. See id. at 206.
63. Id. at 204.
64. See id. at 206-07.
65. Id at 207. A second alleged state interest was "to protect the individuals who have
paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates
from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed
[citation omitted]." Id. at 208. The Court was not entirely clear on its attitude toward this
alleged state interest. Although the Court said that the prevention of corporate war-chests
creating quid pro quo debts and the protection of shareholders and members "are suffi-
cient to justify the regulation at issue," the Court's subsequent discussion focuses entirely
on quid pro quo corruption without further mention of the protection of shareholders. Id
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be used (or could appear to be used) to corrupt public officials
through the creation of quid pro quo relationships.
Although the Court's discussion in NRWC focused on the Buck-
ley notion of quid pro quo corruption,66 it clearly anticipated the "cor-
porate corruption of the political marketplace" theory introduced four
years later in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc.,67 (hereinafter "MCFL") and subsequently applied in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.6"
MCFL involved the constitutionality of requiring a non-profit
corporation to use a segregated fund to make an expenditure on be-
half of political candidates.69 The Court decided that a non-profit cor-
poration may not constitutionally be required to use a segregated fund
for its expenditures on behalf of political candidates if the non-profit
corporation meets certain criteria established by the Court.7" More
important for purposes of the present discussion, however, is the
Court's analysis of the threat of corruption potentially posed by cor-
porate political expenditures.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (hereinafter "MCFL") was a
non-profit, non-stock corporation incorporated in Massachusetts. 71 In
September 1978, MCFL had published a special newsletter in which it
exhorted readers to "vote pro-life" and identified the pro-life candi-
dates in the upcoming election.72 The newsletter was printed with
MCFL's general treasury funds, not with segregated funds.73 The
Court unanimously decided that MCFL had violated FECA's require-
ment that it use segregated funds for such activity.74 The Court then
proceeded to the issue of the constitutionality of the FECA segre-
gated fund requirement as it applied to non-profits.
A plurality of the Court (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and
Scalia), joined in a concurrence by Justice O'Connor, concluded that
FECA was a burden on MCFL's First Amendment rights because
"the corporation is not free to use its general funds for campaign ad-
vocacy purposes. While that is not an absolute restriction on speech,
it is a substantial one. Moreover, even to speak through a segregated
66. See supra text accompanying note 65.
67. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
68. 494 U.S. 652 (1990); see infra Part I.D.
69. See Federal Election Comm'n, 479 U.S. at 241.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 243.
73. See id. at 244.
74. See id. at 250-51.
CORPORATE SPENDING
fund, MCFL must make very significant efforts." The Court went
on to note that because a segregated fund is considered under FECA
to be a "political committee," MCFL's segregated fund must comply
with all the regulations imposed by FECA on political committees.76
If, on the other hand, MCFL were not incorporated, it would not have
to use a segregated fund and would not have to comply with the "po-
litical committee" regulations.77 The plurality noted that it is not an
unconstitutional burden on free speech to require non-profit corpora-
tions to conduct their political activity through a separate segregated
fund in order to receive Section 501(c) tax-exempt status because
"there is no right to have speech subsidized by the Government. '78
Having determined that FECA burdened MCFL's First Amend-
ment rights, a majority of the Court79 next considered whether the
burden was justified by a compelling state interest. The FEC asserted
three such interests, each of which the majority rejected as not appli-
cable to non-profit corporations like MCFL: (1) "the special charac-
75. d at 252.
76. IM at 253.
77. IM at 252. The plurality stated that
[i]t is evident... that MCFL is subject to more extensive requirements and more
stringent restrictions than it would be if it were not incorporated. These addi-
tional regulations may create a disincentive for such organizations to engage in
political speech. Detailed record-keeping and disclosure obligations, along with
the duty to appoint a treasurer and custodian of the records, impose administra-
tive costs that many small entities may be unable to bear [footnote omitted]. Fur-
thermore, such duties require a far more complex and formalized organization
than many small groups could manage. Restriction of solicitation of contributions
to "members" vastly reduces the sources of funding for organizations with either
few or no formal members, directly limiting the ability of such organizations to
engage in core political speech .... Thus, while [FECA] does not remove all
opportunities for independent spending by organizations such as MCFL, the ave-
nue it leaves open is more burdensome than the one it forecloses. The fact that
the statute's practical effect may be to discourage protected speech is sufficient to
characterize [FECA] as an infringement on First Amendment activities.
Id at 254-55. Justice O'Connor in her concurrence emphasized that it is the organizational
restraints imposed by FECA on such groups as MCFL, rather than the disclosure require-
ments discussed by the majority, that constitute a significant burden on First Amendment
rights of non-profits. Id at 266 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
78. Id at 256, n.9.
79. The majority consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Scalia, and
O'Connor. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred
in the judgment that MCFL had violated FECA, but dissented from the majority's decision
that FECA's segregated fund requirement was unconstitutional as applied to non-profit
corporations like MCFL, on the grounds that the Court should defer to Congress' judg-
ment that political spending by non-profit corporations poses a threat of corruption. Id. at
266-71. White, while joining the Chief Justice's dissent, also stated that he continued to
adhere to his dissenting views in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 257, Bellotti, 435 U.S. 789, and Fed-
eral Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480
(1985).
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teristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful
regulation;"80 (2) preventing "an organization from using an individ-
ual's money for purposes that the individual may not support;"8' and
(3) the prevention of "massive undisclosed political spending. ''a 2
With respect to the FEC's first argument, a majority of the Court
agreed that corporate spending by business has the potential for cor-
ruption of the political marketplace through "unfair deployment of
wealth for political purposes,"' 3 but concluded that groups such as
MCFL do not pose such a danger of corruption.' Building on the
Court's previous statements about the rationale for restricting the in-
fluence of corporations on the political process,85 however, the Court
in dicta restated its theory of why corporate political speech may be
regulated, this time without reference to quid pro quo corruption.
Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect
that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to
provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace. Political
"free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in
the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources [citations
omitted]. Relative availability of funds is after all a rough barometer
of public support. The resources in the treasury of a business corpora-
tion, however, are not an indication of popular support for the corpo-
ration's political ideas. They reflect instead the economically
motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of
these resources may make a corporation a formidable political pres-
ence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection
of the power of its ideas.
By requiring that corporate independent expenditures be fi-
nanced through a political committee expressly established to engage
in campaign spending, [FECA] seeks to prevent this threat to the po-
80. Id. at 256 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 260.
82. Iad at 262.
83. Id at 259.
84. The Court specifically stated that it was not deciding the constitutionality of
FECA's segregated fund requirement as applied to commercial enterprises. Ii at 263.
That issue was later addressed in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
658-60, see infra Part I.D.
85. According to the MCFL majority, the rationale for regulating corporate political
activity has been described "as the need to restrict 'the influence of political war chests
funneled through the corporate form;' to 'eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on
federal elections;' to curb the political influence of 'those who exercise control over large
aggregations of capital;' and to regulate the 'substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by
the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization."' 479 U.S. at 257
(citations omitted).
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litical marketplace. The resources available to this fund, as opposed
to the corporate treasury, in fact reflect popular support for the politi-
cal positions of the committee.86
The Court also noted, however, that MCFL, as a non-profit en-
tity, did not have the potential to disrupt the political marketplace
through use of resources amassed in the economic marketplace.8 7 On
the contrary, the resources MCFL had available "are not a function of
its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the polit-
ical marketplace."8 8 Therefore, the Court concluded, "MCFL is not
the type of [corporation] that has been the focus of regulation of cor-
porate political activity." 89
With respect to the FEC's argument that the state has a compel-
ling state interest in protecting stockholders and members from their
money being used for purposes they do not support, the Court again
made a distinction between business corporations and labor unions on
the one hand, and non-profit corporations like MCFL on the other.
The Court stated that while stockholders of corporations and mem-
bers of unions contribute their funds for economic gain rather than
political purposes, contributors to organizations like MCFL expect
their money to be used for political purposes.9" Therefore, the state
does not have a compelling interest in protecting contributors to non-
profit political organizations such as MCFL from political use of their
money.
86. 479 U.S. at 257-58 (citations omitted). The MCFL Court's explanation of its the-
ory sounds a lot like Justice White's dissent in Bellotti. Justice White in Bellotti had argued
that the State's interest in regulating corporate political activity was not based on equaliz-
ing voices,
but rather o[n] preventing institutions which have been permitted to amass
wealth as a result of special advantages extended by the State for certain eco-
nomic purposes from using that wealth to acquire an unfair advantage in the po-
litical process .... Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the
role of the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas ....
Corporate political expression.., is not only divorced from the convictions of
individual corporate shareholders, but also, because of the ease with which corpo-
rations are permitted to accumulate capital, bears no relation to the conviction
with which the ideas expressed are held by the communicator.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809-10 (White, J., dissenting).
87. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259.
88. Id.
89. 479 U.S. at 259. The Court distinguished NRWC by observing that MCFL con-
cerned expenditures, whereas NRWC concerned contributions. Thus, the Court returned
to the distinction made in Buckley between expenditures and contributions. See supra Part
I.A. "We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling
justification than restrictions on independent spending." MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259-60.
90. See 479 U.S. at 260-61.
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The Court quickly dispensed with the FEC's third argument in
favor of the FECA regulation by stating that the inapplicability of
FECA's segregated fund requirement to MCFL would not "open the
door to massive undisclosed political spending" because "an indepen-
dent expenditure of as little as $250 by MCFL will trigger the disclo-
sure provisions of [FECA]."'1 "The state interest in disclosure
therefore can be met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the
full panoply of regulations that accompany status as a political com-
mittee under [FECA]. 92
Finally, the Court set forth the three "essential features" of
MCFL that justified its conclusion that FECA's segregated fund re-
quirement may not constitutionally apply to MCFL.
First, [MCFL] was formed for the express purpose of promoting
political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities.... This
ensures that political resources reflect political support.'
Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as
to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that per-
sons connected with the organization will have no economic dis-
incentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its
political activity.
Third, MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a
labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from
such entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as
conduits for the type.of direct spending that creates a threat to
the political marketplace. 93
91. Id. at 262.
92. Id.
93. ILa at 263-64. A disagreement has developed over how narrowly to interpret this
third MCFL factor. According to the FEC, a non-profit must either not accept any dona-
tions from business corporations or must have an actual policy against accepting contribu-
tions from business corporations and labor unions in order to qualify for an exemption
from FECA's segregated fund requirement pursuant to MCFL. 11 C.F.R.
§ 114.10(c)(4)(iii) (1999); see also Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. FEC, 113 F.3d
129, 130 (8th Cir. 1997) (FEC follows narrow interpretation); FEC v. Survival Education
Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1995) (the FEC argues that "only an absolute policy
against accepting contributions from business corporations and labor unions would guaran-
tee that a non-profit.., would not abuse its corporate form"). The FEC's narrow interpre-
tation has been accepted in two cases. See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 778 F.
Supp. 62, 64 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dis-
missed 513 U.S. 88 (1994) and Faucher v. FEC, 743 F. Supp. 64, 69-70 (D. Me. 1990), affd
928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 820 (1991). Several other courts, however,
have adopted a more flexible approach, finding that a non-profit entity does not have to
have an actual policy in place as long as the non-profit is in fact independent of business
interests. See North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 714 (4th Cir.
1999); Community Advocate Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm., 705 N.E.2d 414 (Ohio App.
1997), appeal dismissed 692 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio 1998); FEC v. Survival Education Fund, Inc.,
65 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 1995); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115 S.
Ct. 936 (1995). Montana's 1-125 followed the more flexible approach, requiring that non-
Thus, the Court established these three features as criteria an or-
ganization must meet in order to be constitutionally exempt from
FECA's segregated fund requirement. Even after MCFL, however,
the constitutionality of a segregated fund requirement for corpora-
tions that do not meet the three MCFL criteria remained unresolved.
That question was answered a few years later in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, when the Court fully adopted its "corporate
corruption of the political marketplace" theory in upholding as consti-
tutional a Michigan law requiring corporations to make expenditures
on behalf of political candidates only out of segregated funds.94
D. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce95 involved a suit by
the Michigan Chamber of Commerce ("the Chamber") to have de-
clared unconstitutional a Michigan statute that required corporations
to make expenditures on behalf of political candidates only out of seg-
regated funds.96 The Chamber was a non-profit corporation compris-
ing more than 8,000 members, three-quarters of whom were for-profit
corporations. The Chamber sought to use its general treasury, funded
by annual dues paid by its members, to pay for an advertisement in a
newspaper supporting a specific candidate. The Chamber sued to
have declared unconstitutional the Michigan statute prohibiting such
use of its general funds. The Supreme Court first briefly discussed
why the segregated fund requirement was a burden on corporations'
free speech rights, quoting its previous discussion in MCFL. It then
went on to conclude that the state has a compelling interest in
preventing corruption in the political arena.
profit corporations must accept no more than 5% of their total revenue from for-profit
corporations. See infra Part II.
94. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
95. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
96. The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited direct corporate contributions or
expenditures. See Michigan Campaign Finance Act, 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 388, MicH.
CoMp. LAWS §§ 169.254, 169.206 (1979) quoted in Austin, 494 U.S. at 697-98 n.1 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). Expenditure was defined as anything of value for purposes of influencing a
candidate, but did not include a communication on a subject or issue that did not support
or oppose a candidate by name or clear inference. Thus, the law did not prohibit corpora-
tions from spending their general treasury funds on issue advocacy. The Michigan law also
explicitly stated that "nothing in this section shall preclude a corporation.., from making
an independent expenditure in any amount for the qualification, passage or defeat of a
ballot question." § 169.254.
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In upholding the constitutionality of the Michigan statute, a 6-3
majority of the Court97 finally acknowledged what it had hinted at in
NRWC and implied in MCFL: that the corruption threatened by cor-
porate political expenditures was not necessarily political quid pro
quo,9s but a "different type of corruption in the political arena." 99
This "New Corruption," as Justice Scalia calls it in his Austin dis-
sent,100 is "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas."' 0'
The Austin majority held that preventing such distorting (i.e. cor-
rupting) effects was a sufficiently compelling rationale to justify Mich-
igan's restriction on independent expenditures by corporations on
behalf of political candidates. The Court emphasized that "the mere
fact that corporations may accumulate large amounts of wealth is not
the justification for [the regulation]; rather, the unique state-conferred
corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries
warrants the limit on independent expenditures."'0 2 The Court ex-
plained that
[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages-such as
limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the
accumulation and distribution of assets-that enhance their
ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways
that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments.
These state-created advantages not only allow corporations to
play a dominant role in the Nation's economy, but also permit
them to use "resources amassed in the economic marketplace"
to obtain "an unfair advantage in the political marketplace."'0 3
The Court rejected the argument that Michigan's statute was un-
derinclusive because of its failure to regulate expenditures by unincor-
porated labor unions. Rather, the court emphasized that the state's
compelling interest in regulating such expenditures by corporations
was the "desire to counterbalance those advantages unique to the cor-
97. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Marshall, Brennan,
White, Blackmun, and Stevens, with Justice Marshall authoring the opinion. The dissent-
ers were Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor.
98. Presumably the Court could not apply the quid pro quo rationale in Austin be-
cause Buckley had held that the rationale was inapplicable to independent expenditures.
See supra Part I.A.
99. 494 U.S. at 660.
100. 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. 494 U.S. at 660.
102. 494 U.S. at 660.
103. 494 U.S. at 658-59 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257).
porate form .... ,104 Excluding unincorporated unions, which do not
receive such advantages, therefore "does not undermine [the state's]
justification for regulating corporations.' ' 1°5
Having found that the state's interest in preventing the "new cor-
ruption" was compelling, the Court concluded that Michigan's statute
was sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. The
Court upheld the Michigan statute against challenges that it was over-
inclusive because it included closely held corporations that were not
wealthy within its scope, stating that the special benefits received by
such corporations from the state, and the potential of such corpora-
tions to distort the political marketplace, justified the general applica-
bility of Michigan's law to all corporations. 10 6
The Court concluded that because the Chamber did not meet any
of the three criteria established in MCFL, the Michigan statute was
constitutional as applied to the Chamber.0 7 The Chamber failed the
first MCFL criterion because its bylaws set forth several purposes that
were not inherently political, such as to disseminate information, to
train its members, and to promote ethical business practices. The
Chamber failed the second criterion because many of its members
might be reluctant to withdraw from the Chamber over political dif-
ferences because of the business benefits obtainable through the
Chamber. Finally, the Chamber failed the third MCFL criterion be-
cause the Chamber's close connection to businesses created the poten-
tial for those businesses to funnel their political payments through the
Chamber in a bid to circumvent the Michigan statute.10 8
The Court summarily rejected the Chamber's Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection argument that "unincorporated associa-
tions with the ability to accumulate large treasuries" should be regu-
lated along with corporations. 0 9 The Court reiterated that the state's
compelling interest is in eliminating the corruption made possible by
special benefits granted by the state to corporations." 0 Unincorpo-
rated entities do not receive such benefits. Therefore, corporations
and unincorporated entities are not similarly situated, and there is no
violation of the right to equal protection.
104. 494 U.S. at 665.
105. Id., quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258, n.11.
106. See 494 U.S. at 661.
107. See id. at 662-65.
108. See id.
109. See id at 665.
110. See id.
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The Supreme Court has thus moved from a focus on quid pro quo
corruption as the justification for regulation of political contributions
to a far more tenuous conception of corruption that justifies the com-
prehensive regulation of essentially all corporate political contribu-
tions and expenditures. Austin thus represents a dramatic change in
the Court's thinking since Buckley and Bellotti and opens the door to
new state regulations like Montana's 1-125 which was based, nearly
word for word, on the Court's opinions in MCFL and Austin.
H. Montana's Initiative 125
In November of 1996, Montana voters approved 1-125, prohibit-
ing corporations in Montana from making contributions or expendi-
tures in connection with ballot measure campaigns out of the
corporation's general treasury."' As in the Michigan law that was the
subject of Austin, corporations were permitted to establish a separate,
segregated fund for making contributions or expenditures as long as
that fund consisted only of voluntary contributions from individuals
who are shareholders, employees, or members of the organization."12
Although the prohibition extended to non-profit corporations, the law
did exempt from the prohibition those non-profit corporations that
met the MCFL criteria.1 13
111. Expenditures "in connection with" means only express advocacy using such words
as "vote for," or "support." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52. Montana law already
prohibited such contributions or expenditures in connection with a candidate. MoNT.
CODE ANN. §13-35-227 (1997).
112. Thus, after passage of 1-125, Montana law (MoNT. CODE ANN. §13-35-227 (1997))
stated:
(1)(a) Except as provided in subsection (4), a corporation may not make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with a candidate, a ballot issue, or a political committee which
supports or opposes a candidate, a ballot issue, or a political party.
(b) For purposes of this section, "corporation" refers to for-profit and non-profit
corporations.
(3) This section does not prohibit the establishment or administration of a separate segre-
gated fund to be used for making political contributions or expenditures if the fund consists
only of voluntary contributions solicited from an individual who is a shareholder, em-
ployee, or a member of the corporation....
113. Section 13-35-227(4) stated that the prohibitions on using general treasury funds in
connection with a ballot issue do not apply to a non-profit corporation formed for the
purpose, among others, of promoting political ideas, and that:
(a) does not engaged [sic] in business activities;
(b) has no shareholders or other affiliated person who have a private claim on the corpora-
tion's assets or earnings;
(c) does not accept foreign or domestic forprofit corporations as members; and
(d) does not accept in the aggregate more than 5% annually of its total revenue from
foreign or domestic forprofit corporations.
The impetus behind 1-125 was a concern thit wealthy corpora-
tions were subverting the democratic process in Montana. Thus, the.
preamble to 1-125 stated that the processes of initiative and referen-
dum are a vital part of the political process in Montana; and... corpo-
rations are now making direct corporate expenditures of
overwhelming amounts of money in Montana initiatives; and... par-
ticipation in the political system needs to be kept fair to citizens of
normal financial means; and.. . limitations on direct corporate contri-
butions work toward that fairness.
Jonathan Mot, a representative of Montana Common Cause and
a chief proponent of the Initiative, explained that
1-125 was written because there is too much money in Mon-
tana politics and nowhere is so much spent by so few than on
ballot campaigns.... Large out-of-state corporations now rou-
tinely dump hundreds of thousands of dollars into ballot issue
campaigns .... 1-125 continues a 90-year history of reform
aimed at preserving Montana's initiative process for its
citizens." 4
C.B. Pearson, the executive director of Montana Common Cause,
stated that reform of ballot issue campaign funding was needed "to
prevent a total corruption of the [initiative] process. Without reform
we can expect to see Montana voters move away from this democratic
tool with cynicism and disgust.""' 5 According to Pearson, "corpora-
tions shouldn't be able to buy votes like they buy wood. It's just not
fair."" 6
1-125 was carefully drafted by its proponents both to reflect and
extend the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the constitutional-
ity of state regulation of corporate political spending. Shortly after I-
125's passage, however, the Montana Chamber of Commerce and sev-
eral other for-profit and non-profit corporations sued in federal dis-
trict court to have 1-125 declared unconstitutional." 7 While that suit
was pending, the Montana legislature approved House Bill 575, which
extended 1-125's coverage to include essentially all organizations, not
114. Jonathan Mot], Letter to the Editor, Great Falls Tribune, Oct. 29, 1996, at 7A, col
1.
115. Steve Shirley, Ballot-Issue Financing Is at Issue in 1-125, Great Falls Tribune, Oct.
2, 1996, at 7A, col. 2.
116. Jason Kozleski, 1-125 Would Ban Corporate Giving to Campaigns, a First for Na-
tion, Great Falls Tribune, Oct. 26, 1996, at 1B, col. 1, 2B.
117. See Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, Cause No. CV-97-6-H-CCL
(D. Mont. 1997).
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just corporations. 118 In February 1998, the Federal District Court for
the District of Montana declared House Bill 575 to be unconstitu-
tional, 1 9 but permitted the suit seeking to have 1-125 declared uncon-
stitutional to proceed to trial. The complaint against 1-125 argued
several constitutional infirmities with the initiative, all but one of
which were rejected by the court on motion for summary judgment.120
The remaining issue that finally went to trial in October 1998 was a
challenge to 1-125 on First Amendment grounds.
The federal district court found that 1-125 violated the First
Amendment, and so declared 1-125 to be unconstitutional.12' The
court determined that 1-125 was a significant infringement of core
First Amendment speech,'122 and that therefore the State must show a
compelling interest to justify such an infringement. "Leveling the
playing field by equalizing the strength of citizen speech relative to
corporate speech" was found by the court not to be consistent with
the First Amendment,"z which left only the argument that the State
has a compelling interest in preventing the existence or appearance of
corruption, defined by the court as "real harm to the integrity of Mon-
tana's ballot initiative process."' 24 The court found that although such
harm is conceivable, the
118. H.B. 575,55th Leg. (1997), codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-236 (1997). The
proponents of H.B. 575 claimed that "the purpose of the bill is to level the playing field for
all organizations in Montana to make sure all groups are treated equally by campaign law
regardless of how they are organized." SENATE COMM. ON STATE ADMIN., Minutes, Hear-
ing on H.B. 575, Opening Statement by Sponsor at 11 (Mar. 12, 1997). Opponents of H.B.
575, however, argued that the bill's intent was unconstitutionally to expand the coverage of
1-125 in to order effectively repeal 1-125. See id. at 14 (testimony of Tara Mele), 15 (testi-
mony of Beverly Fox).
119. See Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, Opinion and Order on Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, CV 97-6-H-CCL, Feb. 18, 1998 (D. Mont.). See also
Montana Right to Life Association v. Eddleman, 999 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Mont. 1998) (H.B.
575 unconstitutional as applied).
120. See Argenbright, Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
CV 97-6-H-CCL, Feb. 18, 1998 (D. Mont.). The court rejected arguments contending that
1-125 was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define "business activities," "corpora-
tions," "for-profit corporations," or "non-profit corporations," and that it violated Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights.
121. See Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 28 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (D.
Mont. 1998).
122. According to the court, 1-125 infringed core political speech because it "deprives
corporations of the ability to communicate political ideas directly to the electorate[,J ...
chills impermissibly the speech and association rights of corporations, their officers and
employees[,] ... precludes corporations from directly resisting potential laws that could
put them out of business[,] ... [and] prevents the electorate from being exposed to diverse




meager anecdotal evidence presented by the Defendants wholly
fails to prove that... corporate contributions or expenditures in
ballot initiative campaigns have had any adverse effect on the
integrity of Montana's political process. Specifically, the State
has failed to produce evidence that would support a judicial
finding that corporate wealth has dominated citizen voices to
the detriment of the ballot initiative process."
The proponents of 1-125 have appealed the district court's deci-
sion to the Ninth Circuit,'2 6 which held arguments on November 3,
1999.
In requiring the proponents of 1-125 to prove that corporate political
spending in Montana has undermined public confidence in the ballot
initiative process, the court relied entirely on Bellotti's statement that,
although there can be no quid pro quo corruption in connection with
ballot measure campaigns, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court
might find such corruption to exist if the state could prove that "cor-
porate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment
interests."' 27 And, as the Supreme Court had in Bellotti, the federal
district court rejected as sufficient the evidence offered by the propo-
nents of the law that corporate spending is indeed undermining public
confidence in the political system." Curiously, the court virtually ig-
125. Argenbright, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 600. See Lopach, Montana's Role in the Free Speech
vs. Equal Speech Debate, 60 MoNT. L. tnv. 475, 486-96 (1999) for a more detailed discus-
sion of Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright.
126. See Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, C.A. No. 98-36256 (9th Cir.).
The case has been combined with Montana Mining Ass'n v. Argenbright, C.A. No. 98-
36257, which appeals the district court's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction against
Initiative 137, prohibiting the use of cyanide at new open-pit gold and silver mines and
mine expansions, on grounds that 1-125 unconstitutionally prevented corporations from
participating in the debate on 1-137. The case was tried by the district court immediately
after Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright. The district court denied the motion
for preliminary injunction on October 22, 1998, because "the relief sought was premature"
since the election had not yet been held and so 1-137 was not yet law. Argenbright, 28 F.
Supp. 2d at 601. 1-137 was approved by the voters of Montana on November 3, 1998, and
the Montana Mining Association, Majesty Mining of Butte and Yellow Band Gold of Mis-
soula filed a new suit on November 4, 1998 seeking to have 1-137 invalidated on several
theories, including that the plaintiffs were illegally prohibited by 1-125 from engaging in
political speech during the 1-137 campaign. Montana Mining Ass'n v. State of Montana,
CV-98-48-8-CCL (D. Mont. 1998), Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Count II at 6-8. The
District Court dismissed the suit on October 26, 1999, Montana Mining Ass'n v. Simonich,
Case No. CV-98-48-H-CCL (D. Mont. 1999) upon the motion of the plaintiffs, who appar-
ently did not have sufficient funds to continue. Mining Group Ends 1-137 Challenge, Boze-
man Daily Chronicle, Oct. 23, 1999, at 4.
127. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789; see supra text accompanying notes 35-56.
128. See Argenbright, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
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nored Austin, 29 which goes well beyond Bellotti and, as argued in the
next section, should have served as the basis for upholding the consti-
tutionality of 1-125. °
The attempt in Montana to extend Austin's political marketplace
theory to ballot measure campaigns highlights the substantial
problems with the Austin theory. Because the logic of the Austin the-
ory is as applicable to ballot measure campaigns as it is to candidate
elections, Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright will require
the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps the Supreme Court, to decide whether
Austin is still good law and thus to allow significant regulation of cor-
porate speech on ballot issues, or whether Austin's theory is mis-
guided and should be abandoned. This article argues that the second
course of action is the better one.
HI. Austin's Logical Applicability to State Ballot
Measure Campaigns
The proponents of 1-125 in Montana carefully drafted the initia-
tive to both reflect the theories of MCFL and Austin, and to test
whether, despite Bellotti, the courts would be willing to extend the
Austin "corporate corruption of the political marketplace" theory be-
yond candidate elections to state ballot measure campaigns.' 3' Al-
though several courts have refused to allow limits on independent
corporate expenditures on ballot measure campaigns even after Aus-
tin,'32 in fact there is no principled reason for not extending Austin to
129. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
130. See discussion in next section.
131. Because there are no federal ballot measure campaigns, Austin could be extended
only to state ballot measure campaigns.
132. The cases addressing regulation of corporate spending on ballot measure cam-
paigns have generally done so in the context of a complete prohibition on such corporate
spending, rather than in the context of a segregated fund requirement. See, e.g., Greater
Austin Chamber of Commerce v. City of Austin, No. A 98 CA 597 SS, at 6 n.3 (W.D. Texas
1998) (granting injunction against city law prohibiting corporate expenditures on ballot
measure campaigns, distinguishing Austin as not applicable to ballot items); Brown v. State,
680 So. 2d 1179, reh'g denied. LEXIS 3727 (La. 1996) (striking down as unconstitutional a
prohibition on contribution to or expenditure on behalf of a political committee organized
to support or oppose a ballot proposition by a licensee of the Louisiana Gaming Control
Board, no reference to Austin); Vote Choice, Inc. v. Di Stefano, 814 F. Supp. 195 (D.R.I.
1993), affd 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993) (granting permanent injunction against enforcing state
law prohibiting corporations from making independent expenditures with respect to ballot
questions, citing Bellotti but not Austin). Two federal judges in Montana have found I-
125's segregated fund requirement for corporate spending on ballot measure campaigns to
be unconstitutional. See Argenbright, 28 F. Supp. 2d 593, see also discussion supra Part II;
Montana Right to Life Association v. Eddleman, 999 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Mont. 1998) (1-125
unconstitutional as applied to Montana Right to Life Association; distinguishing Austin as
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ballot issues. If one accepts Austin's "corporate corruption of the po-
litical marketplace" theory, as a matter of basic logic one must also
accept its applicability to referendum and initiative campaigns.
The old Buckley theory of corruption stated that large contribu-
tions to candidate campaigns can, or in the eyes of the voting public
can appear to, result in quid pro quo arrangements whereby a person
contributes to a candidate running for office and the candidate, once
elected, returns the favor by acting in the contributor's interest rather
than in the public interest. 133 Because this theory of corruption is
based on elected officials acting in the interests of contributors, the
Court in Bellotti rejected the theory as a constitutional basis for regu-
lating corporate spending on ballot issue campaigns, since in the case
of a ballot measure there is no elected official who can do favors for a
contributor. Instead, Bellotti required a state seeking to regulate cor-
porate speech on ballot measure campaigns to prove that "corporate
advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes,
thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment inter-
ests . . ,"I"4 So far, this standard has proven to be impossible to
meet. 35
Austin's "political marketplace" theory of corporate corruption,
however, has opened up a whole new avenue by which to evaluate
corporate political spending, one that no longer requires any proof of
actual or imminent corruption. Austin essentially concludes that cor-
not applicable to ballot measure campaigns). Another case, Brower v. State of Washington,
969 P.2d 42 (Wash. 1998), cert denied 526 U.S. 1088, (1999), addressed the issue indirectly.
In Brower, Football Northwest had agreed to fund a referendum submitted by the Wash-
ington legislature to the people of Washington asking whether a new football stadium
should be built. The referendum was scheduled for 60 days after the legislature authorized
the referendum. Plaintiff Brower argued that his First Amendment and equal protection
rights were violated by such a short time-frame in which to raise money in opposition to
the stadium. Citing Buckley, Berkeley, and Bellotti, but not Austin, the Washington Su-
preme Court found that the contributions to ballot question campaigns do not pose the
same threat of quid pro quo corruption as contributions to candidate campaigns, and that
the First Amendment does not require an equalization of voices or spending.
133. Cf. FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480,497 (1985) ("Elected officials
are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain
to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is
the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.").
134. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
135. The Court rejected offers of proof of such undermining of democratic processes in
both Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90 & 811 (White, J., dissenting), and MCFL, 454 U.S. at 307
(White, J., dissenting), as did the Federal District Court in Montana Chamber of Commerce
v. Argenbright, 28 F. Supp. 2d 593 (D. Mont. 1998).
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porate political spending by definition corrupts the political process.13 6
There is nothing left to prove: corporations by definition receive spe-
cial state-granted advantages, and these advantages enable corpora-
tions to amass wealth in the economic marketplace which can then
corrupt the political marketplace. After Austin, the corrupting influ-
ence of corporate political speech is a conclusive presumption.'37
Because the Austin "political marketplace" theory of corruption
focuses on the corporate characteristics of the speaker rather than on
the speaker's potential relationship with an individual candidate, there
is no reason to limit the theory's applicability only to candidate cam-
paigns. The existence of a candidate simply is no longer relevant. If
money amassed in the economic marketplace by definition corrupts
candidate campaigns, it must also by definition corrupt ballot measure
campaigns. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he persuasive power
of corporate resources is equally effective in" candidate elections and
referenda.'38 Perhaps one basis upon which potentially to distinguish
candidate from ballot-measure campaigns for purposes of Austin's
corporate corruption theory is to define the political marketplace dif-
ferently for the two types of campaign. Nothing the Supreme Court
has said provides the basis for such a distinction, however. In MCFL,
the Court based its political marketplace conception on Justice
Holmes' statement that "the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
136. The Court stated in Austin that "the unique state-conferred corporate structure
that facilitates the accummulation of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent
expenditures." 494 U.S. at 660. Because all corporations by definition have this state-
conferred corporate structure, and because it is this structure that threatens corruption of
the political marketplace, corporations by definition are corruptive of the political process.
137. Cf. Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 133, 193 (1998) (Austin
dispenses with need to show evidence of corporate dominance in political process).
138. Charles D. Watts, Corporate Legal Theory Under the First Amendment: Bellotti
and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 317, 340 n.89 (1991). See also Briffault, Campaign Fi-
nance, the Parties and the Court: A Comment on Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 14 CONST. COMMENTrARY 91,102 (1997) ("Aus-
tin's expansion of 'corruption' to include 'undue influence' over election outcomes elimi-
nates the significance of' the distinction between referenda elections and candidate
elections); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 133, 174 (1998) (no reason
not to extend Austin-type corruption to ballot measure campaigns); Gerald D. Ashdown,
Controlling Campaign Spending and the "New Corruption": Waiting for the Court, 44
VAND'. L. REv. 767, 780 (1991) ("legislatures are now free to restrict corporations to spend
only from separate segregated funds in ballot measures as well as candidate elections");
David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust, 9 YALE L. & POL'y Rv. 236,252 (1991) ("corrup-
tion is no less troubling in referenda than in candidate elections").
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ..... "I
The Court then stated that "[p]olitical 'free trade' does not necessarily
require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with
exactly equal resources .... The resources in the treasury of a busi-
ness corporation, however, are not an indication of popular support
for the corporation's political ideas. ' 140 Thus, the Court's conception
of the political marketplace seems to be founded on the "free trade"
of political ideas. If the marketplace is a marketplace of ideas, then
surely there is no difference between the political ideas espoused by a
candidate and those raised in the context of a ballot measure
campaign.
The Court and individual justices have tried to draw a distinction
between the applicability of the Austin theory to candidate as opposed
to ballot measure campaigns. These efforts, however, are unconvinc-
ing. In MCFL, for example, the Court specifically distinguished the
applicability of the corporate corruption of the political marketplace
theory in the context of candidate campaigns from "the complete
foreclosure of any opportunity for political speech" in the context of a
state referendum that was the subject of Bellotti.141 That is an easy
distinction to make, of course: it is rare that political speech can con-
stitutionally be silenced totally. The harder case, which the Court did
not address in either MCFL or Austin, is whether the corporate cor-
ruption of the political marketplace theory can justify the application
of a segregated fund requirement, which significantly burdens but ar-
guably does not totally foreclose corporate speech, to ballot measures.
Justice Brennan in his Austin concurrence explicitly stated that,
after Austin, corporations remain "free ... to use general treasury
funds to support an initiative proposal in a state referendum."1 42
However, Brennan's statement arose in the context of defending Aus-
tin against the argument that the Michigan segregated fund law was
underinclusive because it regulated only expenditures in connection
with candidate campaigns, not referenda or other corporate expres-
sion. Justice Brennan explained that "to the extent that the Michigan
statute is 'underinclusive,' ... this reflects the requirements of our de-
cisions rather than the lack of an important state interest on the part
of Michigan in regulating expenditures in candidate elections." 143 He
139. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
140. 479 U.S. at 257, 258.
141. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259 n.12.
142. 494 U.S. at 676 (citing Bellotti).
143. ld. at 678 (emphasis added).
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thus implied that Michigan applied its segregated fund requirement
only to candidate campaigns because Bellotti had been interpreted not
to permit regulation of corporate speech on ballot measure cam-
paigns. The Court has now adopted a new theory of corruption differ-
ent from the quid pro quo theory used in Bellotti to strike down state
regulation of corporate speech on ballot measures; therefore, it re-
mains an open question whether a segregated fund requirement may
constitutionally be applied to corporate speech on ballot issues. That
is in fact what Montana attempted to do through 1-125.
Justice Stevens concurred in Austin because he believed that the
danger of quid pro quo corruption in the context of corporate partici-
pation in candidate elections justified state regulation of both corpo-
rate contributions and expenditures. 1" Citing Bellotti, he added that
"there is a vast difference between lobbying and debating public is-
sues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public
office on the other." '145 Thus, Justice Stevens seems unwilling to ex-
tend Austin's theory to ballot measure campaigns. On what basis he
would decline to do so, however, is not clear, since Austin has moved
the Court's jurisprudence on the regulation of corporate speech on
ballot issues beyond Bellotti.
Thus, despite some attempts to limit Austin to candidate elec-
tions, there is no principled way to avoid extending the corporate cor-
ruption of the political marketplace theory to corporate expenditures
on ballot measure campaigns.1 46 If corporate wealth amassed in the
economic marketplace corrupts the political process with respect to
candidate elections, then it also must do so with respect to state initia-
tive and referendum campaigns.1 47 That is not to say, however, that
such extension is a good outcome. In fact, the Austin corporate cor-
144. See id. at 678.
145. Id.
146. In Montana's 1-125 case, the court simply ignored the possibility that Austin could
be applied in the context of ballot measure campaigns. See Argenbright, 28 F. Supp.2d 593.
The judge did so despite the fact that a year earlier he had discussed Austin at some length
and seemed willing to at least entertain the argument that Austin could apply to ballot
measure campaigns. See Argenbright, Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, CV 97-6-H-CCL, Feb. 18, 1998, at 20-29.
147. The Austin theory has ramifications far beyond the scope of this article. For exam-
ple, it also threatens Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures. See
Austin, 494 U.S. at 702-03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Richard Briffault, Campaign
Finance, the Parties and the Court: A Comment on Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 14 CONST. Co Mm ARY 91, 101 (1997) ("If
undue influence on the electoral process-and not just undue influence over elected offi-
cials, which is the sole focus of the quid pro quo model-could become a basis for cam-
paign finance restrictions, then both the practical ability and the normative rationale for
ruption theory is badly flawed, and rather than extending it to ballot
issue campaigns, the Court should simply abandon it altogether.
IV. The Segregated Fund Requirement and Austin's
Corporate Corruption of the Political Marketplace
Theory Are Unconstitutional and
Bad Policy.
In evaluating the constitutionality of a regulation which is alleged
to infringe on the First Amendment's protection of political speech,
one must analyze three key issues: First, is the regulation a substantial
burden on core First Amendment rights? If so, does the regulation
serve a compelling (or, in the case of political contributions, a suffi-
ciently important) state interest? If the answer is yes again, is the reg-
ulation narrowly drawn to accomplish its purpose? Only if the answer
is "yes" to all three questions does the regulation pass constitutional
muster. The following analysis uses this framework to conclude that
the Austin theory of corporate corruption of the political marketplace
is untenable in the context of both candidate and ballot issue
campaigns.
A. The Segregated Fund Requirement is a Substantial Burden on
Core First Amendment Speech.
Corporate political speech is protected by the First Amendment
because it is the type of speech that is essential to an educated electo-
rate. The segregated fund requirement is a burden on such free
speech. Therefore, the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis is
satisfied.
1. Corporate Speech is Protected by the First Amendment Right to Free
Speech.
The value assigned to corporate political speech, as opposed to
speech by a natural person, depends on a large extent upon which
theory of free speech is applied. For example, the "self-realization"
theory that the First Amendment's purpose is to enhance an individ-
ual's ability to develop her own personal powers and abilities,14 8 tends
distinguishing between contributions and expenditures for First Amendment purposes
would be substantially eroded.") (emphasis added).
148. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 235, 244-45
(1998).
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not to value corporate speech highly because the corporation does not
exist as an entity that can be "self-realized."'
1 49
By contrast, another theory of free speech dictates that corporate
speech is as essential to public discourse as is individual speech. This
theory states that the public must be able not only to speak, but also
to hear other points of view in order to be able to participate in the
democratic process. Accordingly, "there is practically universal agree-
ment that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment [is] to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs.""' The First Amendment
affords the broadest possible protection to political expression in or-
der "'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people."" 5 "De-
mocracy depends on a well-informed electorate, not a citizenry legisla-
tively limited in its ability to discuss and debate candidates and
issues."'1 52
The Supreme Court in Bellotti relied heavily on this theory in de-
termining that corporate speech on a ballot initiative is protected by
the First Amendment. As the Court said, "[t]he inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not de-
pend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual.'1 53 Corporate speech on ballot measures and
candidate campaigns serves to inform the public about the importance
and ramifications of the measures just as individual speech does. In
order for the electorate to make informed decisions in the voting
booth, it must be exposed to all sides of an issue, including the corpo-
rate side. Corporations are simply one voice in the sea of voices of
149. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting) ("[W]hat some have
considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment, the use of communication
as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by
corporate speech."); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 133, 198-200
(1998). But see Redish & Wasserman, supra note 148 (arguing that the corporate form
facilitates personal self-realization).
150. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
151. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 49 n.55. Cf United States v. International Union United Auto, Aircraft &
Agric. Implement Workers of America, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The people determine through their votes the destiny of the nation. It is therefore im-
portant-vitally important-that all channels of communication be open to them during
every election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that the people have
access to the views of every group in the community.").
153. 435 U.S. at 777.
political discourse, all of which voices are essential to a functioning
democratic process. 154
The state's limiting of corporate voices in political debates se-
verely restricts the quality and quantity of the very information that is
essential to the maintenance of an informed electorate. Contrary to
those who argue that a reduced corporate voice would increase confi-
dence in the democratic system, such reduction in fact severely under-
mines the robustness of the political debate. Consequently,
restrictions on corporate political speech fundamentally undermine
the vitality of the democratic system.' 55
Other theories of free speech that demand corporate participa-
tion in political discourse are the so-called "negative" theories that
"derive from the skeptical, mistrustful strain underlying American
democratic theory, manifested more generally in the theory of separa-
tion of powers." '56 These theories hold that free speech is necessary
for ensuring that government does not accumulate too much power
and that it does not control individual voices. 157 In order to serve
these functions, public speech must arise from diverse sources and
must represent diverse interests, corporate interests among them. 5 '
Negative theories posit that limiting or silencing corporate speech will
undermine democracy by removing from public discourse some of the
voices that are likely to be most effective at countering governmental
propaganda. 5 9 As Justice Scalia said in his Austin dissent, "[t]o elimi-
154. Cf Austin, 494 U.S. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (fact that political speech
comes from corporation "detracts not a scintilla from its validity, its persuasiveness, or its
contribution to the political dialogue"); see also, Redish & Wasserman, supra note 148, at
248.
155. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 148, at 258 ("Ironically, although it is the
corporation's wealth and power that often causes opponents of corporate speech to call for
its restriction, that very power is what makes corporate speech most valuable to the facili-
tation of both the democratic process and the listener's self-realization. The result of re-
stricting the corporate voice, then, is that debate on a political issue is considerably less
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' than the First Amendment commands.") (footnotes
omitted).
156. Id. at 243-44.
157. See id. at 262-66.
158. See id. at 263-64.
159. See id. at 262 ("The checking value demands protection for speech by 'institutions
outside of government with the resources, energy, and expertise to counter the govern-
ment's messages' and actions. The countervailing voices, according to Professor Blasi,
should be 'well-organized, well-financed,' and 'capable of disseminating their information
and judgments to the general public.' Of many organized constituencies that fit this
description, one of the potentially most effective is the profitmaking corporation." (quot-
ing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GovERNmENT SPEAKS at 161 (1983); Vincent Blasi, The Path-
ological Perspectives of the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1985)). See
also Redish & Wasserman, supra note 148, at 263 ("In the context of the checking function,
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nate voluntary associations-not only including powerful ones, but es-
pecially powerful ones-from the public debate is either to augment
the always dominant power of government or to impoverish the public
debate."16
These theories do not assume that the corporate point of view
will always be well-informed, unbiased and informative. In fact, much
of the time it will not be so. However, much of the time speech by
individuals, public interest groups, non-profits and government also
do not meet these standards. The point is that the entire mix of all
voices together will provide the electorate with information that will
enable voters to make more informed decisions than if one or more of
these voices were not a part of the political discourse.161 Because cor-
porate speech is protected under the First Amendment as essential to
the functioning of the democratic process, the first prong of the strict
scrutiny analysis next requires an examination of whether a segre-
gated fund requirement for corporate political speech is a substantial
burden upon such speech.
2. The Segregated Fund Requirement is a Substantial Burden on Free
Speech
The segregated fund requirement is a substantial burden on cor-
porate political speech for several reasons. First, the segregated fund
requirement burdens corporate speech because it prohibits corpora-
tions themselves from speaking. While corporations are permitted to
establish and administer segregated funds,162 contributions to the
funds may be solicited only from shareholders, employees and mem-
the greater the number of motivated and powerful private speakers, the smaller the danger
of undue power centralization and unchecked governmental excess.").
160. Austin, 494 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Some have also argued that regulation of corporate speech may in fact be a little
more than disguised regulation based on content. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note
148, at 238 (regulation of corporate speech may be "an indirect but nonetheless invidious
form of viewpoint regulation"); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption,
Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 54 (1997) (easy to target content-neutral
legislation so as to limit speech of others). Content-based regulation is subject to the strict-
est scrutiny because it poses "the inherent risk that the Government seeks.., to suppress
unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather
than persuasion." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); see
also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85 ("the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictat-
ing the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a pub-
lic issue."); Austin, 494 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Content-based restrictions
are the essence of censorial power.").
162. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 n.31. In Montana, see MoNr. CODE ANN. § 13-35-
227(3) (1997).
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bers, not from the corporation's general treasury. Therefore, the cor-
poration itself is prohibited from speaking.163
Second, the segregated fund requirement imposes significant or-
ganizational and disclosure burdens on corporations because the law
regulates a segregated fund as a political action committee.164 Typical
requirements include the appointment of a treasurer, who must record
almost all contributions received along with the names and addresses
of the contributors; the filing of organizational and financial informa-
tion with the government; and the frequent and detailed reporting to
the government of information on receipts, contributions, and ex-
penditures, as well as on the fund's financial condition.'65 According
to the MCFL plurality, such requirements "may :create a disincentive
for [organizations subject to the segregated fund requirement] to en-
gage in political speech.' 66 Small entities in particular are likely to be
discouraged by the administrative costs associated with the detailed
record-keeping and disclosure obligations, the requirement to appoint
a treasurer, and the more formalized organizational structure required
to comply with the law.' 67 It is therefore likely that at least some or-
ganizations subject to a segregated fund requirement have chosen, or
will in the future choose not to participate in political discourse. 68
Third, restricting solicitations for segregated funds to sharehold-
ers, employees and members seriously limits the amount of money
small corporations are able to raise to promote their viewpoints. Most
companies in the U.S. have fewer than ten employees. 69 Therefore,
163. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. 2 U.S.C § 431(4)(B) (1997); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-101(18) (1997) (definition
of political committee).
165. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 251-56 (plurality opinion); see id. at 266 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 432-34; MoNT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-201 et seq.; MIcH.
Comp. LAWS § 169.201 et seq. (1989 & 1999 Supp.).
166. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 254 (plurality opinion); see id. at 266 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("The significant burden on MCFL in this case comes.., from the additional organi-
zational restraints imposed upon it by [FECA].").
167. See id. at 254-55 (plurality opinion).
168. Cf. Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1082-83 (1996) ("Typically, regulation
favors those already familiar with the regulatory machinery and those with the money and
sophistication to hire the lawyers, accountants, and lobbyists needed to comply with com-
plex filing requirements. Such regulation will naturally disadvantage newcomers to the
political arena, especially those who are themselves less educated or less able to pay for
professional services. Efforts to regulate campaigns in favor of small contributors thus
have the perverse effect of professionalizing politics and distancing the system from 'ordi-
nary' citizens." (speaking of candidates, not ballot measures) (footnotes omitted)).
169. According to Bank One, "[s]mall businesses with fewer than 10 employees account
for nearly 80 percent of all U.S. companies." For Small Business Owners, Exposure is a
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these companies probably cannot raise significant amounts for their
segregated funds.
Extension of the segregated fund requirement to corporate
spending on ballot measure campaigns will be particularly burden-
some on the large group of non-profit corporations that do not meet
all of the MCFL criteria, but on occasion may want to participate in
the political discourse on initiatives and referenda. 170 Not only are
there significant administrative costs associated with creating segre-
gated funds, but for those non-profit corporations which do not cur-
rently have members17 ' but which desire to participate in ballot
measure debates will probably need to reorganize as membership or-
ganizations in order to be able to solicit contributions to their segre-
gated funds from members. 72 Membership organizations must follow
myriad regulations, including for example membership votes and an-
nual meetings, that can impose significant additional costs on the or-
ganization.' 73 Rather than choosing to establish segregated funds,
some organizations may even elect to disincorporate in order to avoid
the restrictions of the segregated fund requirement as applied to bal-
lot measure campaigns."7 Because of the costs associated with all of
these options, the segregated fund requirement will cause many non-
profit corporations simply to sit out the political debate, thus depriv-
ing voters of important perspectives and information.
At least one commentator contends that the segregated fund re-
quirement does not substantially burden free speech because it does
not stop corporations from speaking and does not inhibit the public's
right to hear speech, but merely requires that such speech be con-
Goa" Time is Precious; Internet Increasingly the Office Tool of Choice, Bank One Press
Release (July 28, 1999), available online at <http://www.shareholder.com/fcn/news/
19990728-9863.htm>.
170. In Montana, for example, the list of non-profit corporations affected by 1-125 in-
cluded the Montana Stockgrowers Association, the Montana Wool Growers Association,
the Montana Chamber of Commerce, the Montana Farm Bureau, the Montana Hospital
Association, the Montana Medical Association, and the Montana Taxpayers' Association.
See Argenbright, 28 F. Supp.2d at 599 Other affected non-profits include most charitable
and social welfare organizations.
171. Non-profits can choose whether to incorporate as member or non-member organi-
zations. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 6.03 (1988).
172. Cf. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 255 (plurality opinion) ("[r]estriction of solicitation of
contributions to "members" vastly reduces the sources of funding for organizations with
either few or no formal members, directly limiting the ability of such organizations to en-
gage in core political speech.").
173. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 7.01 et seq. (1988).
174. The Montana Education Association disincorporated in order to avoid the re-
quirements of 1-125. See Argenbright, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
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ducted through a separate entity.17 The plurality in MCFL rejected
this position, however:
[While [FECA's segregated fund requirement] does not re-
move all opportunities for independent spending by organiza-
tions such as MCFL, the avenue it leaves open is more
burdensome than the one it forecloses. The fact that the stat-
ute's practical effect may be to discourage protected speech is
sufficient to characterize [the segregated fund requirement] as
an infringement on First Amendment activities. 176-
Some might argue that a segregated fund requirement is not a
substantial burden on free speech because it merely regulates express
advocacy, leaving corporations free to engage in issue advocacy as
long as the corporations do not overtly urge votes in support of or in
opposition to a candidate or ballot issue.177
Issue advocacy is permitted for non-profit 501(c)(3) organizations
without a segregated fund as long as the advocacy falls under the defi-
nition of "educational activity," which requires that the activity indeed
be educational, Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729, and that the pur-
pose of the activity is educational, I.R.C. 501(c)(3). 78 Issue advocacy,
however, is not an adequate substitute for express advocacy because
the corporation may not urge a vote for or against an initiative or
referendum. Therefore, the corporation's choice of what to say is lim-
ited, as is the public's ability to learn from the corporation's clearly
stated position. Moreover, according to some commentators, issue
advocacy is abused in the context of candidate campaigns,'1 79 and
175. Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 133, 156, 196-97 (1998).
176. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 255.
177. Only expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate
may constitutionally be regulated. See id. at 248-50 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42, 80).
Buckley had held that "expenditures in connection with" an election must be interpreted to
cover only express advocacy in order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness. 424 U.S. at 44.
The Court stated that express advocacy requires such words as "vote for," "elect," "sup-
port," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," "reject." Id.
at 44 n.52. If the segregated fund requirement is extended to ballot issue campaigns, it too
must be limited by this express advocacy interpretation in order to avoid unconstitutional
vagueness.
178. See Frances R. Hill, Corporate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance: Exempt Orga-
nizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rnv. 881, 928 (1997).
179. See, e.g., Lisa Rosenberg, A Bag of Tricks: Loopholes in the Campaign Finance
System, part 2 (1996), Center for Responsive Politics, available online at <http://
www.opensecrets.org/pubs/lawbagtricks/loop3.html>; Comments of Common Cause and
Democracy 21 in response to FEC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding Public Fi-
nancing of Presidential Primary and General Election Candidates (Feb. 1, 1999), available
online at <http:lwww.commoncause.orglpublications/020199_letter.htm>; Nixon, 120 S.Ct.
at 914 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (issue advocacy means "advertisements that promote or
attack a candidate's positions without specifically urging his or her election or defeat");
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there is no reason to think it will not be similarly abused in the context
of ballot-issue campaigns.' 80 Thus, corporations will do everything
they can to convince voters to support or oppose an initiative without
using the magic express advocacy words.' 8 ' The result is a limitation
on useful political speech without achieving the asserted purpose of
preventing corporate resources earned in the economic marketplace
from distorting the political marketplace.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is beyond serious dispute that
the segregated fund requirement is in fact a significant burden on free
speech. Accordingly, strict scrutiny requires an analysis of whether,
despite this significant burden, the regulation promotes a compelling
state interest.
B. Austin's Alleged State Interest Is Unconstitutional and 111-Defined.
Several state interests have been asserted by litigants, courts, and
commentators as sufficient to justify regulation of corporate political
speech. Because the Supreme Court has so far accepted only two
state interests as sufficiently important to sustain such regulation, this
North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1999) ("issue
advocacy may influence an election even though it does not expressly advocate the election
or defeat of a particular candidate or party."); See also Mariani v. United States, No.
3:CV-98-1701 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1999) (mem.) (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http://
www.pamd.uscourts.gov/docs/maria.htm> (soft money, which is used in part for issue advo-
cacy, presents the same threat or appearance of corruption as does money contributed
directly to a candidate). Mariani certified to the Third Circuit the question of whether
FECA's prohibition on corporate contributions to federal candidates violates the First
Amendment in light of "the presently existing law that otherwise permits corporations to
expend unlimited amounts of corporate treasury funds that influence the outcome of fed-
eral elections," id. at 139, and whether FECA is unconstitutional because of overbreadth,
Id. at 140.
180. See, e.g., Peter Schrag, California, Here We Come, ArLAmnc MoNTHLY, March
1998, 20, 29-30 ("California shows that the process of bedazzling voters with sound bites,
slogans, and nuanced bias works as effectively in the initiative process as it does in electo-
ral politics.").
181. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (express advocacy requires such words as "vote
for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "de-
feat," "reject"). But see 11 C.F.R. §100.22(b) (1999), in which the FEC defines "express
advocacy" to include communications which, "when taken as a whole... could only be
interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat" of a
candidate because the electoral portion of the communication "is unmistakable, and sug-
gestive of only one meaning" and "reasonable minds could not differ" with respect to the
real nature of the communication's message. There is a split among the Circuits on the
constitutionality of this definition, with the Ninth Circuit supporting it, and the First and
Fourth Circuits holding it to be unconstitutional. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Maine Right to Life Committee v. FEC, 98
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied 522 U.S. 810 (1997); FEC v. Christian Action Network,
92 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997).
article discusses only these two interests. 82 Critics of the "share-
182. Other state interests that have been asserted include preventing the "drowning
out" of certain viewpoints and equalizing access to political speech; preventing "informa-
tion overload" of the electorate; and the protection of shareholders against unwilling par-
ticipation in the political speech of the corporation.
Appellee in Bellotti posited a state interest in preventing the drowning out of other points
of view by wealthy and powerful corporations, which "threatens imminently to undermine
democratic processes." 435 U.S. at 789. Although Bellotti rejected this theory of political
corruption on grounds that it had not been proven to exist in that case, the Court did
suggest that the theory might be compelling enough to justify regulation if proven. See id.
Because wealthy corporations are able to pay more for more advertising, the theory is that
voters will be unfairly swayed by the corporate point of view simply because they hear that
view expressed more often than other views. This theory leads quite naturally to the argu-
ment that democracy does not work unless all people have equal, or at least more equal,
financial ability to engage in and disseminate political speech. Although the Court has
never actually used this theory of corruption to sustain a political spending regulation,
many commentators have argued vigorously for its adoption. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley,
Equal Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 1204 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. Rlv. 1390, 1390 (1994) (the "achievement of political equality is an important
constitutional goal"); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Pri-
mary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273 (1993); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Struc-
ture, 71 IowA L. Rlv. 1405 (1986); Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is
the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982). But
see Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors: Corpo-
rate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 235, 268 (1998) (it
is a "paternalistic assumption" that "massive amounts of corporate speech are likely to
persuade listeners, regardless of the merits of the ideas presented.").
Another alleged compelling state interest is the prevention of information overload of the
electorate. See, e.g., Redish & Wasserman, supra note 148, at 268. With the advent of
cable television and the Internet, no one can possibly hear or read, let alone absorb and
understand all information available. Therefore, the overload theory argues, the more a
voter is bombarded with information, the less rational that voter's political choices will be.
Information overload therefore threatens to corrupt and undermine democratic processes.
Critics of both the "drowning out" and "information overload" theories assert that there is
no such thing as too much information, and that voters can intelligently "separate the
wheat from the chaff," as Justice Scalia has put it. Austin, 494 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); see id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Others, however, have argued that more
information is not necessarily better because people cannot gather all relevant information
themselves and must rely on others' opinions as a guide for their own decisions. Thus, a
little bit of information early can result in a "cascade, in which a small change in the initial
starting points results in a huge change in the end point." Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Essen-
tial Speech: Why Corporate Speech is Not Free, 83 IowA L. REv. 996, 1019 n.68 (1998).
The last alleged compelling state interest in regulating corporate political speech is the
protection of shareholders whose money is used by the corporation to engage in speech
with which a shareholder may disagree. Although the Court in Bellotti agreed that this is a
legitimate state interest, it is not settled that it is sufficiently compelling to sustain a sub-
stantial burden on constitutionally protected free speech. See 435 U.S. at 792. Austin did
address members' interests in the speech of organizations to which they belong, 494 U.S. at
662-66, but the Court did not hold that the protection of shareholders or members is a
compelling state interest. See id. at 660 (after discussion of corporate corruption theory,
without reference to protection of shareholders, Court holds that Michigan "has articu-
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holder protection" rationale for regulation of corporate political
speech, however, have challenged the notion that the state interest in
protecting shareholders is really important. They generally argue that
if a shareholder does not agree with the political speech of the corpo-
ration, the shareholder can either try to get a majority of the other
shareholders to object to the speech, or simply sell his or her shares.' 3
Furthermore, attempts to regulate corporate political speech based on
shareholder protection generally are underinclusive because they still
allow corporations to engage in non-political speech with which indi-
vidual shareholders may disagree."8 Moreover, non-corporate orga-
nizations also often have members that may disagree in whole or in
part with the organization's speech, so that protection only of corpo-
rate shareholders is underinclusive.
lated a sufficiently compelling rationale"), id. at 665 ("the desire to counterbalance [state-
conferred] advantages is the State's compelling interest in this case"). Some commentators
have assumed that protection of shareholders was deemed in Austin to be a compelling
state interest, see, e.g., Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under the First
Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 317, 333 (1991); Adam Winkler,
Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 133, 163-64 (1998). The Court, however, never
explicitly endorses this theory, but rather merely cites MCFL in its discussion in Austin of
the responsibilities of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce to its members. Justice Bren-
nan in his Austin concurrence does seem to argue that Michigan's segregated fund require-
ment is intended to protect shareholders, 494 U.S. at 670-71 (Brennan, J., concurring), but
this is not specifically stated in the Austin majority opinion and Justice Scalia assigns the
argument only to Justice Brennan, not to the majority. See id. at 685-86 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); but see id. at 709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[t]he majority relies on the state interest
in protecting members from the use of nonprofit corporate funds to support candidates
whom they may oppose.").
Proponents of the "protection of shareholders" theory assert that shareholders' invest-
ments in the corporation should not be used by the corporation for political speech be-
cause: (1) shareholders invest for economic gain, not in order to engage in political speech
(See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 260; see Winkler at 165, 170-71); (2) shareholders depend on their
investment for income, so they have a financial disincentive to sell their shares in the cor-
poration if they do not agree with the corporation's political position (See MCFL, 479 U.S.
at 260; see Austin, 494 U.S. at 674 (Brennan, J., concurring)); (3) it is costly for sharehold-
ers to monitor corporate political communications (See id.; see Winkler at 167-68); (4) it is
not really practical for shareholders simply to sell their shares if they disagree with corpo-
rate speech, since many shareholders invest through mutual funds or institutional investors
(See Wimkler at 166-67); (5) it is usually very difficult for dissenting shareholders to con-
vince other shareholders to support shareholder proposals opposed by management (See
id. at 166); (6) selling one's shares after the corporation has already engaged in objectiona-
ble political speech is pointless (See id. at 168); and (7) shareholders' First Amendment
rights should protect them against having their money used to engage in political speech
with which they disagree (See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812-13 (White, J., dissenting); see Win-
kler at 170-71 & 202 et seq.).
183. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. See id.
CORPORATE SPENDING
The first state interest accepted by the Supreme Court is Buck-
ley's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption involving the trad-
ing of campaign contributions for political favors. Because such
conduct threatens the ability or willingness of publicly elected officials
to act in the best interest of the public that elected them, such corrup-
tion undeniably threatens the entire democratic system and the state's
interest in preventing such conduct is certainly compelling. As noted
by the Court in Bellotti, however, this type of corruption is possible
only in the context of candidate elections; it cannot justify regulation
of contributions and expenditures in connection with ballot measure
campaigns because such campaigns do not result in the election of a
person who can do favors for a contributor.185
The second state interest that has been found by the Supreme
Court to be sufficiently compelling to justify the regulation of political
speech is the interest asserted in Austin. Rather than the prevention
of quid pro quo corruption as described in Buckley, the Austin state
interest is the prevention of "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the pub-
lic's support for the corporation's political ideas."' 86 There are two
parts to this new theory of corruption, one of which is a substantive
concern with corruption, while the second is designed narrowly to tai-
lor the theory in order to allow it to pass constitutional muster. De-
spite the Court's best efforts, however, the state's asserted interest is
not constitutionally sufficient.
1. Immense Aggregation of Wealth Is Insufficient Basis for a Sufficient
State Interest.
The first component of Austin's alleged state interest theory is the
notion that it is "unfair," and therefore corrupting of the democratic
process, to allow money to be spent on political speech in amounts
that are out of proportion with public support for that speech.187 Al-
though the Court phrased this concern as arising out of the ability of
corporations to amass great resources with the help of state-conferred
185. But see John S. Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance and the Courts:
Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 29 U.
MiAMI L. Rnv. 377, 385 (1985) (ballot propositions "have involved the reality or appear-
ance of bribes, extortion, and personal gain").
186. 494 U.S. at 660.
187. See id. at 659 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257); see also 494 U.S. at 693 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The fundamental approach of the First Amendment, I had always thought,
was.., to rule the regulation of political speech 'for fairness' sake' simply out of bounds.").
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advantages, in fact the concern is much broader than just corporate
speech. The clear implication is that any money spent on political
speech that is out of proportion to the public's support for that speech
is in some way "corrosive and distorting," and therefore corruptive of
the political process. If corporate money spent in the political arena is
corruptive of the political process because the amount of money spent
does not necessarily reflect popular support for the corporate political
position asserted, then the same money spent by a non-corporate en-
tity or an individual also creates that corruptive influence.188 No ra-
tional justification exists for limiting "disproportionate" political
spending by corporations while leaving unregulated similarly "dispro-
portionate" spending by non-corporate entities,'89 whether in the con-
text of candidate or ballot measure campaigns. 9 °
Some people may argue, of course, that limiting everyone's abil-
ity to expend funds in the political marketplace is exactly what is
needed, and that money spent on everyone's political speech should in
fact represent at least approximately the level of public support for
that speech. Such an argument does admittedly hold some initial vis-
ceral appeal because it would prevent a wealthy organization or indi-
vidual from dominating the mass media with minority' 9 political
views and thus drowning out more popular views. 92 However, a rule
which stifles expression of unpopular or offensive speech is, in fact,
highly threatening to a democracy designed in part to avoid the tyr-
anny of the majority.'93
While some political positions are deservedly unpopular, it is a
fundamental tenet of our society that speech may not be regulated
188. Cf. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 148, at 267 ( "One could just as easily reason
that an individual's actual amount of advocacy should not be disproportionate to the level
of actual public support that currently exists for his position.").
189. Cf. Gerald G. Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the "New Corrup-
tion": Waiting for the Court, 44 VAND. L. lFv. 767, 781 (1991) ("If the focus of the new
corruption rationale is the correlation between money spent in political campaigns and
public support for the views on which the funds are expended, it becomes difficult to con-
fine the majority's analysis to corporations.").
190. The Court tried to establish such rational justification by focusing on the special
advantages received by corporations from the state that individuals and non-corporate en-
tities do not receive. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text for discussion of why
this justification is inadequate.
191. "Minority" is used here to denote views held by less than a majority of the citizens,
not to indicate a racial minority.
192. See supra note 182 for brief discussion of "equalization," "drowning out" and
"overload" theories advanced to justify regulation of political speech.
193. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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based on content, except in very rare circumstances. 94 If money
spent on political speech must be calibrated to reflect public support,
however, then only speech supported by the majority, or at least a
substantial minority, is likely to be heard because, as the Court recog-
nized almost 25 years ago, "virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires ... money."'195 As a result, the
democratic process established by the Constitution will stagnate as the
"interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes"' 9 6 is no longer unfettered, but instead dictated by whose
speech is most popular.'97 Thus, the Austin Court's new political cor-
ruption theory is ultimately a content-based restriction on political
speech because the theory rests on the fundamental assumption that
the electorate must be protected from corporate political speech that
may not represent the views of the majority.
The content-based nature of the Austin theory becomes particu-
larly problematic when applied to ballot measure campaigns. At least
with candidate campaigns, a candidate's political speech cannot be
limited except to the extent campaign contributions are restricted by
law. Candidates themselves remain free to spend as much as they
want and say anything they wish regardless of popular support. 98
When the theory is applied to ballot-issue campaigns, however, it
quickly becomes apparent that the theory has the potential to severely
curtail discussion about proposed ballot measures. Because a ballot
measure obviously cannot speak for itself by making expenditures out
of its own personal funds due to the fact that it is not a person, the
only speech that can be made in favor of or in opposition to the mea-
sure must occur by means either of contributions to a ballot campaign
organization from individuals or organizations, including corpora-
tions, or through independent expenditures by such entities. If the
194. See Consolidated. Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)
("[T]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to re-
strictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire
topic."); see also Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("Our
precedents ... apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage,
or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.").
195. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
196. Id. at 14.
197. Cf Austin, 494 U.S. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the less popular the speech, the
more important it is that it be aired); see also Redish & Wasserman, supra note 148, at 266
("How... can an idea 'get itself accepted in the competition of the market' if the state can
restrict the idea at the source because of its presumed lack of support?").
198. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59 (holding FECA's limitations on a candidate's ex-
penditures from personal funds and on overall campaign expenditures to be
unconstitutional).
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amount spent on such contributions and expenditures must be propor-
tional to the amount of public support for the speech, the minority
position on the ballot issue may well be overwhelmed by the initially
more popular position, even if the more popular position is based on
misinformation and bad policy. The less-popular position may never
gain a fair hearing or an opportunity to sway public opinion because it
is disadvantaged from the start by spending restrictions on its
proponents.
Application to ballot measure campaigns of the state's alleged in-
terest in ensuring that there is a correlation between money spent and
public support highlights another problem with the theory. Although
it seems intuitively obvious that the more people who support an initi-
ative, the more money will be donated in support of the initiative, this
proposition may not always be true. For example, imagine an initia-
tive that requires the state to spend 5% of its budget on developing
affordable housing. The initiative may be supported by 60% of the
state's citizens, but because these supporters are likely to come prima-
rily from the lower-income sector, they are unlikely to have much
money to contribute to the initiative campaign. 199 Thus, the funds
available to the proponents of the initiative may in fact not actually
reflect the level of public support for the initiative.2°° Of course, the
funding available to the opponents of the initiative also will not accu-
rately reflect the level of public opposition to the initiative.
2. State-Conferred Advantages Are Not Unique to Corporations.
In order to avoid the above-mentioned problems, the Austin
Court insisted that its theory was not that all wealth is corruptive on
the democratic process, but only that wealth accumulated by corpora-
tions with the aid of state benefits is sufficiently corrosive to warrant
regulation.2 ' In fact, it appears that the Court focused on state-con-
199. For example, in 1997 Montana ranked 47th in the U.S. with a per capita personal
income of $19,704, compared to the national average of $25,298. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA
Regional Facts <http:llwww.bea.doc.govlbealregionallbearfacts/stbf9697/30000.htm>. A
person making less than $20,000 per year is unlikely to have any discretionary income to
devote to political activity.
200. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 182, at 1393-94 ("The correlation between public enthusi-
asm and the capacity to attract money is crude.... Candidate A might... attract large
sums of money from wealthy people; but A's supporters may be less interested in her
success than Candidate B's poorer supporters are interested in B's success, even though
B's supporters donate less money.").
201. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 ("the mere fact that corporations may accumulate large
amounts of wealth is not the justification for [the regulation]; rather, the unique state-
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ferred advantages because it was only by limiting the state's alleged
interest to corporate wealth that the Court could justify Michigan's
segregated fund requirement. The Court followed Justice Rehnquist's
lead in his Bellotti dissent 2 2 and concluded that since the state confers
benefits on corporations, the state may also regulate corporations in
ways that would not be permitted were non-corporate entities or indi-
viduals involved. 03 In other words, although it is not acceptable to
limit all wealthy speech, according to Austin it is acceptable to limit
corporate speech because corporations receive advantages from the
state that no other entity or individual does.
The Court's distinction between corporations and non-corpora-
tions based on state-conferred benefits is untenable. The alleged spe-
cial benefits that corporations receive from the state are in fact
available to other entities as well.2°4 Moreover, every organization
and individual receives state benefits of one kind or another that help
the organization and individual accumulate wealth. Regardless of
how one may feel about the amount of money spent on political cam-
paigns, the Court's attempt to distinguish corporate political spending
from all other types of political spending based on state-conferred ad-
vantages is not supported by reality.20 5
conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the
limit on independent expenditures.").
202. 435 U.S. at 822-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. See Watts, supra note 182, for an interesting discussion of corporate theories as
applied in the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases.
204. Some would argue the focus on state-conferred benefits as the basis for permitting
state regulation of corporations is wrong not only because non-corporate entities also re-
ceive benefits, but also because it reflects an incorrect theory of the corporation. Thus,
contractarians view the corporation not as a fictional entity created by the state, and not as
a natural entity separate from its shareholders, but rather as a "nexus of contracts" among
the shareholders, managers, directors, and customers designed to achieve efficiency. See
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819); Watts, supra
note 182, at 329-30. According to this theory of the corporation, benefits are not conferred
by the state but are rather contract terms negotiated by the parties to the corporate con-
tract. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MID. L.
R-v. 80, 85-86 (1991). Therefore, "regulation of corporations cannot be justified under the
Constitution on the ground that corporations receive 'privileges' from the state." 1d. at 86
n.20. See Watts, supra note 182, and Ribstein, supra, for fuller discussions of corporate
theory.
205. There may be other more legitimate grounds on which to distinguish corporations
from non-corporations for purposes of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra
note 182, at 1003 (arguing that corporations act on behalf of a fictional shareholder and so
are "inappropriate participants in the political debate"). Austin was not based upon other
theories, however, and so those arguments are beyond the scope of this article.
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a. Which State-Conferred Advantages Matter?
The Austin theory depends on the state's conferral of special ad-
vantages on corporations that allow corporations to accumulate mas-
sive treasuries and that are not available to other entities.2 °6
Surprisingly, however, Austin says no more than a few words about
exactly what state-conferred advantages are relevant, and even those
few words are vague and imprecise. In fact, not only are the three
advantages mentioned by the Court available to non-corporate inter-
ests, but corporations and other entities receive far more state-con-
ferred advantages than are listed by the Court.20 7 As a result, the
entire Austin theory rests on a very shaky foundation of ill-defined
and perhaps misunderstood benefits allegedly received from the state
only by corporations.0 8
According to Austin, corporations receive advantages from the
state, "such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment
of the accumulation and distribution of assets.12 0 9 This reference is
the only mention in the opinion of exactly which state-conferred ad-
vantages are relevant to the Austin theory. Because the state-con-
ferred advantages given to corporations form the foundation of
Austin's corporate corruption of the political marketplace theory, it is
necessary to examine the advantages specifically listed by the Court,
as well as those not listed, to determine whether those advantages do
in fact distinguish corporations from other entities and individuals,
and whether therefore such advantages justify separate regulation of
corporate speech.
The first advantage listed by the Court is limited liability.210 This
advantage, of course, refers to the fact that by law, shareholders of a
corporation are not personally liable for the debts of the corporation;
they might lose their investment in the corporation, but they are not
206. Note that Austin rejected the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection argument
that the Michigan segregated fund requirement treated similarly situated entities un-
equally, stating that unincorporated organizations do not receive the same benefits from
the state as do corporations, and that therefore corporations and unincorporated entities
are not similarly situated. 494 U.S. at 666.
207. See infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
208. In fairness to the Court, limited liability companies were only just beginning to be
accepted by state legislatures at the time Austin was decided, and limited liability partner-
ships did not even exist yet. These recent developments in the law, however, simply serve
to emphasize the flaws with the Austin theory. With new business entities now easy to
form and widely used, the Court's limitation of corporate speech rights, based on state-
conferred privileges, is simply unjustifiable.
209. 494 U.S. at 658-59.
210. See id. at 658.
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liable beyond that investment."' Limited liability helps corporations
raise funds because it reduces the risk to which the investing share-
holders are exposed.212 Traditionally, no entity other than a corpora-
tion could offer its investors such legal limited liability. The owners of
sole proprietorships, general partnerships and joint ventures all have
unlimited personal liability for the debts of their businesses. Limited
partners in limited partnerships do have limited liability, but general
partners continue to have unlimited liability. Because of this distinc-
tion between corporations and other business forms, corporations ar-
guably used to have an advantage over other entities in raising funds.
Today, however, limited liability is no longer only available to
corporate shareholders. Members213 of limited liability companies
("LLCs") have limited liability,1 4 as do, to some extent, partners in
limited liability partnerships ("LLPs").215 Therefore, limited liability
is not unique to the corporate form, and cannot be one of the state-
conferred benefits that distinguishes corporations from all other enti-
ties, unless LLCs and LLPs are deemed to fall under the Austin
Court's definition of "corporation." Because LLCs and LLPs have
quite different characteristics than corporations,216 however, they
should not be considered corporations for purposes of the Austin
theory. 7
211. See MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION AcT § 6.22 (1997); 1 JAMES D. Cox, ET AL.,
CORPORATIONS § 1.15 (1998-2 Supp).
212. See 1 JAMES D. Cox, Er AL., CORPORATIONS § 1.5 (1998-2 Supp) (limited liability
"is frequently said to be the most important corporate privilege, one that enables a corpo-
ration to attract investors and assemble large amounts of capital.").
213. "Members" are what one might think of as shareholders.
214. See UNnFoRm LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY Acr § 303 (1996); see also 1 JAMES D.
Cox, ET. AL., CORPORATIONS § 1.5 (1998-2 Supp) ("limited liability may be less of a factor
today than it once was in light of the growing number of alternative business forms which
grant limited liability to its owners," such as limited partnerships and limited liability
companies).
215. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFoRM PARTNERsIm Acr § 1.01(c) (1998) (approxi-
mately half the states have LLP statutes that create limited liability for partners in LLPs
that "is substantially indistinguishable from that of corporate shareholders or members of
LLCs.").
216. See BROM3ERG & RiBsTEIN, supra note 215, § 1.04(d) (1998); Barbara C. Spudis,
Limited Liability Companies: An Introduction, in LIMrrED LIABILITY CoMPANiEs: FORMA-
TION, OPERATION AND CONVERION §1.4 (Robert W. Wood ed., 1993).
217. See Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbrigh, where the plaintiffs argued in
their motion for summary judgment that 1-125 was unconstitutionally vague because it did
not define "corporation." The court rejected the argument without discussion. Montana
Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, CV 97-6-H-CCL, Feb. 18, 1998, at 29-30 (D. Mont.).
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The next purported advantage mentioned by the Court is perpet-
ual life.218 "Perpetual life" means that the existence of a corporation
does not depend on the identities of its shareholders.219 In other
words, individual shareholders can buy and sell shares as often as they
like without in any way affecting the legal existence of a corporation.
In contrast, traditional general partnerships effectively ended their ex-
istence when a partner withdrew.220 Perpetual existence is a benefit to
corporations' ability to raise funds because shareholders have greater
certainty that they will not lose their investments due to the dissolu-
tion of the corporation. Partners in a traditional partnership have no
such certainty because such partnerships are dissolved upon the de-
parture of one of the partners.
Today, however, entities besides corporations also have perpetual
existence. Many state statutes now allow partnerships to continue
their existence even after a partner dissociates from the partner-
ship,221 and the organizers of LLCs can choose to have perpetual exis-
tence.222 Perpetual existence also no longer is an advantage reserved
exclusively for corporations. Contrary to Austin, therefore, corpora-
tions' perpetual existence does not form a sound basis for distinguish-
ing between corporations and other types of entities for purposes of
regulating corporate political speech.
The third advantage of the corporate form enumerated in Austin
is "favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of as-
sets. 2 -z  The meaning of this alleged advantage is not explained by
the Court and is not typically recognized as a unique attribute of cor-
porations. Therefore, one can only speculate about the Court's inten-
tion in citing this purported "advantage" conferred by the state upon
corporations. Perhaps the reference is to the tax treatment of corpo-
rations, although it is by no means clear that corporations always re-
218. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658.
219. 1 Cox, ET AL., supra note 212, § 1.5 (1998-2 Supp).
220. A "dissolution" is caused by several events, one of which is the ceasing of a part-
ner's association with the partnership. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHnP Acr § 29, 31 (1914).
Unless otherwise provided by the partnership agreement, a dissolution triggers the winding
up of the partnership, which ultimately results in the partnership's termination. See UMN.
FORM PARTuNRsmp ACr § 38 (1914). Because a dissolution forces the partnership to wind
up, the dissociation of a partner in effect results in the eventual termination of the
partnership.
221. See RviSED UNIFORM PARTNERsHP Acr § 603 & Official Comment 1 (1997)
(remaining partners can choose whether to buy out the departing partner and continue the
partnership, or to dissolve, wind up and terminate the partnership).
222. A member can dissociate from an LLC without causing the dissolution of the com-
pany. See UNIFORM LIMITED LABILITY CoMPANY Acr § 601 Official Comment (1996).
223. 494 U.S. at 658-59.
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ceive more favorable tax treatment than do other types of
organizations.' 4 Moreover, although the Court's list of advantages
sounds a lot like Justice White's list of such advantages in his Bellotti
dissent,' Justice White actually distinguished among "accumulation,
distribution, and taxation of assets," which suggests that since the Aus-
tin Court did not mention taxation as a corporate advantage, that is
not what it meant.
Perhaps the "favorable treatment of the accumulation and distri-
bution of assets" is a reference to the ownership of corporations by
their shareholders, which structure allows a corporation potentially to
raise a great deal of money through public offerings of stock and to
distribute a portion of its earnings to shareholders in the form of divi-
dends. This interpretation of the Court's phrase is supported by the
Austin Court's references to "the unique state-conferred corporate
structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries," '226 and to
"those advantages unique to the corporate form."22 7 These references
seem to point toward a focus on the structure of the corporation, and
specifically, the fact that corporations are owned by their shareholders
but managed by their officers and boards of directors. The interpreta-
tion is also somewhat supported by the Court's assertion that the
three listed advantages "enhance [corporations'] ability to attract capi-
tal and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on
their shareholders' investments,"'"8 although in that phrase the Court
is referring to all three advantages, not just the favorable treatment of
the accumulation and distribution of assets.
If the Court did in fact intend to refer to the ownership of corpo-
rations by their shareholders, there are at least two problems with the
Court's presumption that shareholder-ownership constitutes a state-
conferred advantage which distinguishes corporations from other enti-
ties. First, although large corporations undeniably raise significant re-
sources through public offerings of stock, for most corporations this is
not the primary source of funds. As one commentator has noted,
"most of the assets of any successful business corporation . . . are
likely to have been generated by corporate activities rather than con-
224. Except, of course, tax-exempt organizations under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1988).
225. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting) ("special rules relating to such
matters as limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation
of assets" allow corporations to "increase their economic viability" which in turn can be
used to disrupt democracy).
226. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
227. d at 665.
228. Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
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tributed by shareholders or their equivalents. 2 2 9 Second, LLC inter-
ests and limited partnership shares can also be offered to the public
for sale if permitted by the operating agreement,230 and, because LLC
members and limited partners have limited liability just as do corpo-
rate shareholders, the potential for LLCs and limited partnerships to
accumulate and distribute assets may be just as great as for corpora-
tions. Thus, the allegedly unique corporate advantage of the existence
of shareholders is illusory.
Yet another possible interpretation of the "favorable treatment of
the accumulation and distribution of assets" is the existence of a mar-
ket for the shares of corporations. In other words, perhaps the phrase
is a reference to the former IRS definition of a corporation, which
included the free transferability of ownership interests.2 1 However,
the shares of close corporations typically are not freely transferable,1 2
and despite this non-transferability, the Court refused to exempt such
corporations from the Austin rule. Moreover, interests in non-corpo-
rate entities such as LLCs may be freely transferable if permitted by
the operating agreement .1 3 Therefore, free transferability of owner-
ship interests does not necessarily distinguish corporations from other
entities.
The Court's third alleged special advantage is so poorly defined,
it is not possible to define what exactly the Court meant. Perhaps
corporations do receive from the state favorable treatment of the ac-
cumulation and distribution of assets, but the Court must define and
explain that favorable treatment before it rests a First Amendment
theory upon it.
The Austin Court apparently enumerated the three advantages
discussed above merely as examples of the kind of benefits corpora-
tions receive from the state, rather than as an exhaustive list. After
all, the Court did refer only to advantages "such as" limited liability,
229. Greenwood, supra note 182, at 1010 n.40.
230. See UNIFoPm LIMITED LiABnarry COMPANY Acr § 503 (1996); UNiFoRm LIMrrED
PARTNmERSHip Acr § 704 (1976).
231. Before the advent of the "check-the-box" regulations, 26 U.S.C. § 301.7701-3
(1999), the IRS determined whether to tax an entity as a corporation or a partnership
based on several enumerated factors, one of which was the free transferability of interests.
See 26 U.S.C. § 301.7701-2(a) (1990). An organization had free transferability of interests
if each of its members had the power without the consent of the other members to substi-
tute for themselves a person who is not a member of the organization. See 26 U.S.C.
§301.7701-2(e)(1).
232. Shares in a close corporation are not transferable except to the extent permitted
by the articles of incorporation. See MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION Acr § 11.
233. See UNIFoRM Ln=rrD Lrinirry CowMANY Acr § 503 (1996).
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perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distri-
bution of assets.3 4 Therefore, it is important to consider what other
advantages, if any, are conferred by the state exclusively on corpora-
tions that aid corporations in amassing wealth in the economic
marketplace.
For purposes of taxation, the four traditional indicia of
"corporateness" used to be limited liability, perpetual life, free trans-
ferability of interests, and centralization of management. 35 The first
three have already been discussed above, leaving just centralization of
management as a state-conferred advantage not specifically men-
tioned in Austin. Centralization of management means that manage-
ment decisions are made by a defined group of people-in the case of
a corporation the officers and the board of directors.236 This contrasts
with decision-making authority in partnerships, in which all partners
have management rights?37 Centralization of management tends to
make decision-making more informed and efficient and therefore
often is a benefit to an organizationP3s Once again, however, centrali-
zation of management is no longer unique to corporations. Members
of an LLC may elect to have the company managed by one or more
managers, none of whom must be members of the LLC. 9 Thus,
LLCs have the right to centralized management just like
corporations.240
It is thus apparent that none of the state-conferred advantages
traditionally associated only with corporations is sufficient to support
the Court's assertion that only corporations receive the kind of advan-
tages that enable them to accumulate wealth in the economic market-
234. Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-59.
235. 26 U.S.C. § 301.7701-2(a) (1990). These indicia are no longer used now that the
IRS has adopted the "check-the-box" regulations for choice of entity. 26 U.S.C.
§ 301.7701-3 (1999).
236. The old Treasury regulations stated that an organization had centralized manage-
ment if "any person (or any group of persons which does not include all the members) has
continuing, exclusive authority to make decisions necessary to the conduct of the business
for which the organization was formed." 26 U.S.C. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1990).
237. See UNIFoRm PARTNERSmn ACr § 18(e); REVISED U~nEORM PARTNERSHIP AcT
§ 401(f).
238. See 1 JAMEs D. Cox, Er A.., supra note 212, § 1.5 (1998-2 Supp).
239. See UNIFoRM LmIrTED LiA nr ComirANrYr AcT § 301 (Agency of Members and
Managers), 404 (Management of Limited Liability Company).
240. See Frances T. Wirtz & Kenneth L. Harris, Tax Classification of the Limited Liabil-
ity Company, in LimrrED LmiLrrY ComIAMaNS: FoRMATION, OPERATION AND CONVER-
SION §4.9 (Robert W. Wood ed., 1993).
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place.24' Therefore, the Austin Court's use of these state-conferred
advantages to justify separate regulation of corporate, as opposed to
non-corporate, political speech is insupportable.
b. All Entities and Individuals Receive State-Conferred Advantages.
Further undercutting the Austin reasoning, corporations are not
the only participants in the political process that receive advantages
from the state which enable them to accumulate resources more easily
than they might otherwise be able to do. As Justice Scalia noted in his
dissent, "other associations and private individuals [are] given all sorts
of special advantages that the State need not confer, ranging from tax
breaks to contract awards to public employment to outright cash
subsidies." '242
Tax rules are only one example of the state-conferred advantages
received every day by entities and individuals. LLCs, LLPs and part-
nerships receive the benefit of pass-through tax treatment despite the
fact that their members also receive limited liability and management
flexibility which is not available to traditional for-profit corporations.
Non-profit corporations receive preferential tax treatment, or even
tax-exempt status,243 which allows them to accumulate greater re-
sources than if they were subject to the same taxation rules as other
corporations. Informed individuals can take advantage of various tax-
shelters to protect their income. Other benefits conferred by the state
on organizations and individuals run the gamut from lucrative govern-
ment contracts to protection of private property rights.
c. State-Conferred Advantages Cannot Justify Curtailment of
Corporate Political Speech
Ultimately, the Court's attempt to limit the definition of the
state's interest to corporate spending fails because the Court focuses
on the source of corporate money rather than on its use. If, as is as-
serted by the Austin Court, the problem is too much non-representa-
tive money being spent on political speech, the state's interest must be
241. The IRS recognized in 1995 that many state statutes now "provide that partner-
ships and other unincorporated organizations may possess characteristics that have tradi-
tionally been associated with corporations, thereby narrowing considerably the traditional
distinctions between corporations and partnerships." I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B.
(seeking comments on proposed "check-the-box" regulations).
242. 494 U.S. at 680; see also David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Lais-
sez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & PoL'Y Rnv. 236,267 (1991) (wealthy individ-
uals, like corporations, owe wealth to benefits received from state).
243. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1988).
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in preventing overwhelming amounts of money being spent on politi-
cal speech, regardless of whether the money comes from economic or
other activity. The Court, however, focuses on corporate money being
corruptive of the political process because it is accumulated in the eco-
nomic marketplace with the help of state-conferred advantages. 2' In
order to apply the Austin theory consistently, the Court would have to
permit regulation of all political spending, not just corporate political
spending, because all entities and individuals derive their resources in
some way from the economic marketplace, whether in the form of
sales, donations, salaries, dividends or capital gains, and all do so to
some extent with the help of state-conferred advantages.2 45 Million-
aires should then not be allowed to spend $1 million on promoting
their own political ideas because their money was earned in the eco-
nomic marketplace and may not represent $1 million worth of public
support.246 This is true regardless of whether a millionaire spends his
or her money in support of a candidate for office or a ballot initiative.
C. The Segregated Fund Requirement is Not Narrowly Tailored.
Even if one accepts the Austin theory that the state has a suffi-
ciently important interest in regulating corporate political speech be-
cause such speech is financed by resources accumulated with the help
of state-conferred advantages, a problem still remains. The segre-
gated fund requirement is simply not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
achieve the state's interest.
244. 494 U.S. at 660.
245. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the "New Cor-
ruption": Waiting for the Court, 44 VAND. L. REv. 767,783 (1991) (referring to MCFL, "[i]f
an organization that receives corporate contributions potentially can distort the political
process, it is difficult to see why an individual who receives corporate dividends, interest,
or income is not also a source of corruption").
246. Cf Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance, the Parties and the Court: A Comment on
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 14
CONST. CommiMNTARY 91, 102 (1997) (corporations are not unique "in their capacity to
divert wealth obtained in the economic marketplace to political purposes. Other business
associations-as well as billionaire individuals who benefit from inheritance laws or obtain
their wealth from investments in corporations-may build up campaign war chests 'that
have little or no correlation to the public's support for their ... political ideas."' (quoting
Austin, 494 U.S. at 652)). How one would even begin to calibrate money with public sup-
port is an interesting puzzle. The challenge posed by this endeavor does not necessarily
mean it is not a good idea-after all, most people would probably agree that the hundreds
of millions of dollars that are spent on campaigns in each election cycle could be better
used in other quarters, such as improving education. The problem is how to do so constitu-
tionally, particularly as long as Buckley's prohibition on limitations on expenditures stands
as good law.
Winter 2000]
362 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:309
"Where at all possible, government must curtail speech only to
the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and
must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has
prompted regulation. ' 247 According to Austin, the "particular prob-
lem at hand" is "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggre-
gations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
corporation's political ideas."' 48 Assuming for the sake of argument
this is in fact a compelling state interest, the segregated fund require-
ment for corporations is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet this
particular problem because it is overinclusive.
The segregated fund requirement for corporations sweeps into its
ambit all corporations that do not meet the MCFL criteria, regardless
of whether those corporations actually present a real risk of cor-
rupting the political marketplace by spending money in amounts that
are out of proportion to the public support for the corporate speech.
For example, a two-shareholder close corporation that is barely break-
ing even is deemed under Austin to pose just as great a threat to the
political marketplace as General Motors. The Austin Court dismissed
this concern by stating that all corporations receive state advantages,
and therefore all corporations "present the potential for distorting the
political process."249 Although Justice Brennan admitted the overin-
clusiveness of the rule, he argued that the MCFL criteria sufficiently
address that small class of non-profit corporations to whom applica-
tion of the segregated fund requirement would be unconstitutional." 0
247. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 265.
248. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
249. Id. at 661 (emphasis added). To back up its argument, the Court cited its state-
ment in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982), that the
Court accepts Congress's legislative judgment that it is necessary to guard against corpora-
tions' potential for corruptive influence. As one commentator has noted, however, the
Court has been inconsistent in its respect for legislative judgments:
In the corporations cases, the Court's vacillation has been acute. In different cases, it has
dismissed out of hand the argument that corporations present any danger of undue influ-
ence [Bellotti]; deferred to a Congressional or state legislative judgment that corporations
in general present unique dangers, without requiring that regulation be limited to corpora-
tions that actually amass the wealth necessary to fund a war chest that poses a danger of
undue influence [FEC v. National Right to Work Committee]; and upheld regulation in
principle but required Congress to target only those corporations whose war chests are
divorced from public support [MCFL]. Briffault, supra note 246, at 104.
The Court's most recent pronouncement on legislative judgments has come in Nixon, 120
S.Ct. at 906, in which the Court states that "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the
novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."
250. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 672 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan said nothing about all the small, for-profit corpora-
tions that have not amassed enormous treasuries or about those non-
profits that do not meet the MCFL criteria because they were not
formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas.
The MCFL majority also acknowledged the overinclusiveness of
the segregated fund requirement as applied to corporations that do
not meet the MCFL criteria, but said that business corporations "are
by far the most prominent example of entities that enjoy legal advan-
tages enhancing their ability to accumulate wealth," 1 and that Con-
gress's failure "at present" to
seek to regulate every possible type of firm fitting this descrip-
tion does not undermine its justification for regulating corpora-
tions. Rather, Congress's decision represents the "careful
legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a 'cautious
advance, step bystep,"' to which we have said we owe consider-
able deference. I
Such a cautious approach to regulation is unnecessary. If the
problem is some corporations amass overwhelming resources in the
economic marketplace that can then be used to distort the political
marketplace, it should be relatively easy for Congress and state legis-
latures to decide how much money is "overwhelming" and then sim-
ply to limit independent expenditures accordingly. In other words,
simply limit expenditures in the same way contributions are limited. 3
It is completely unnecessary to paint with as broad a brush as Austin
permits.
Some may argue that small corporations with only a few share-
holders are not really affected by the segregated fund requirement
because the individual shareholders can simply make contributions or
expenditures in their own names and do not need to speak through
their corporations. This contention misses the point by arguing that
the segregated fund requirement is not a significant burden on speech,
rather that the segregated fund requirement for corporations is suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored. As discussed above, because the segregated
fund requirement imposes detailed organizational and disclosure de-
251. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258, n.11.
252. Id. (quoting FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197,209 (1982)).
253. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 688 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If narrow tailoring means any-
thing, surely it must mean that action taken to counter the effect of amassed 'war chests'
must be targeted, if possible, at amassed 'war chests.' And surely such targeting is possi-
ble-either in the manner accomplished by the provision that we invalidated in Buckley,
i.e. by limiting the prohibition to independent expenditures above a certain amount, or...
by limiting the expenditures of only those corporations with more than a certain amount of
net worth or annual profit.").
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mands, it may be prohibitively expensive for small corporations, or
even large but unprofitable ones, to create a segregated fund, leaving
the shareholders no choice but to speak as individuals, thereby losing
the unique message that may more effectively be communicated by a
corporation than by an individual shareholder. The point therefore is
not whether shareholders in a small corporation have an alternative
way to speak; rather, the issue is whether a constitutional manner of
speaking is foreclosed by an insufficiently narrowly tailored
regulation. 4
The segregated fund requirement is also overinclusive because it
includes non-profit corporations that do not meet the MCFL criteria
but also do not pose any threat of distorting the political market-
place." Such non-profits might include all of those organizations
formed not with the express purpose of promoting political ideas, as
required by MCFL, but rather with charitable or social welfare pur-
poses, including, for example, parent-teacher associations, environ-
mental groups, museums and symphonies. Many such organizations
may occasionally wish to participate in public debate on political is-
sues, including ballot questions, but most are unlikely to accumulate
war-chests large enough to "corrupt" the political process."5 None-
theless, if the state's concern is about such non-profits using excessive
amounts of money to distort the political process, it should be a rela-
tively simple matter just to place a limit on amounts that may be ex-
pended.257 If, on the other hand, the concern is about organizations
using members' money to engage in political speech with which the
members disagree, the state can simply require such non-profits to in-
254. The Court has "consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may justify
a content-based prohibition by showing that speakers have alternative means of expres-
sion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 n.10 (1980);
see also Nixon, 120 S.Ct. at 921, n.6 ("[W]e have rejected the notion that a law will pass
First Amendment muster simply because it leaves open other opportunities.").
255. Justice Kennedy was particularly concerned about the different classes of non-
profits created by MCFL and Austin. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(as a result of MCFL and Austin, First Amendment protection "is given only to a preferred
class of non profit corporate speakers: small, single issue non profit corporations that pass
the Court's own vague test for determining who are the favored participants in the electo-
ral process.").
256. There are, of course, tax-exempt organizations with huge resources, such as the
American Association of Retired Persons, The Nature Conservancy, the American Medi-
cal Association and, of course, the American Bar Association.
257. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 501(h) (1988 & 1999 Supp), creating a sliding scale of permissible
lobbying expenditures by certain tax-exempt organizations based on an organization's ex-
penditures for its tax-exempt purpose.
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form members that their money may be used for political purposes. s
There is no reason to include in the Austin theory any non-profit
organizations.
Some may argue that including non-profit corporations within the
Austin theory is not significant because most tax-exempt corporations
are already effectively precluded from spending money on political
speech by the Internal Revenue Code restrictions on the political ac-
tivities of charitable and social welfare organizations. 25 9 However,
there is a huge difference between the Congress's refusal to pay for
political speech through tax-exemptions and the state's attempt in
Austin to regulate such speech. The limitations imposed on tax-ex-
empt organizations by Congress are not subject to constitutional anal-
ysis because "there is no right to have speech subsidized by the
Government. '260 Unlike in Austin, tax law organizations remain free
to engage in as much political speech as they wish as long as they pay
taxes. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Code restriction on charitable
organizations participating in ballot measure campaigns provides only
that such organizations may not devote a "substantial part" of their
activities to attempts to influence legislation,261 leaving charities the
ability to engage in some speech on ballot measures. Austin, on the
other hand, allows no such speech by non-profit organizations failing
to meet the MCFL test except to the extent such non-profits can raise
additional money from their members for a segregated fund.
Even if one accepts that the state has a compelling interest in
preventing corporate corruption of the political marketplace as de-
fined in Austin, the segregated fund requirement for corporations is
258. Cf MCFL, 479 U.S. at 261 ("persons may desire that an organization use their
contributions to further a certain cause, but may not want the organization to use their
money to urge support for or opposition to political candidates solely on the basis of that
cause. This concern can be met, however, by means far more narrowly tailored and less
burdensome than [FECA's] restriction on direct expenditures: simply requiring that con-
tributors be informed that their money may be used for such a purpose."). This is probably
equally true for corporations generally, demonstrating further why the segregated fund
requirement is not sufficiently narrowly tailored.
259. In order to retain their tax-exempt status, charitable and social welfare organiza-
tions may not participate or intervene in any campaign of a candidate for public office, see
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) & (c)(4) (1988 & 1999 Supp.), and tax-exempt charitable organiza-
tions may not spend a "substantial part" of their activities on attempts to influence legisla-
tion, which includes ballot measures. Bruce R. Hopkins, THE LAw oF TAX-EX pMr
ORGANIZATIONS § 20.1 (1998). Social welfare organizations may engage in campaigning
for or against ballot issues. See id at § 17.4. Most organizations can probably legally, if not
realistically, create separate segregated funds or political action committees to engage in
political activity. See id
260. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 256 n.9.
261. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
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not sufficiently narrowly tailored to prevent such corruption because
it curtails political speech by corporations that do not present a threat
to the political process. Thus, the Austin theory cannot stand up to
strict scrutiny and does not pass constitutional muster.
D. The Austin Theory of Corruption Should Not Be Extended to
Ballot Measure Campaigns
A segregated fund requirement for corporations justified by the
new political corruption theory espoused in Austin should not be ex-
tended to ballot measure campaigns. Not only is the Austin theory of
corporate corruption of the political marketplace unsound as demon-
strated above, but the segregated fund requirement is not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to be constitutional. Ballot initiatives and referenda
are increasingly used as essential tools of democracy within the
states.262 For the reasons stated above, restriction of for-profit and
non-profit corporate speech on ballot issues through a segregated
fund requirement will unconstitutionally undermine the very demo-
cratic process the state seeks to protect.
V. Conclusion
Austin found constitutional a prohibition on corporations' inde-
pendent expenditures in connection with a political candidate cam-
paign, as long as the corporation is permitted to establish and
administer a segregated fund whose purpose is to engage in such polit-
ical speech. A corporation may not contribute its own general trea-
sury funds to the segregated fund, but may solicit contributions to the
fund from shareholders, employees and members. Montana voters
approved an initiative that attempted to extend the Austin holding to
corporate expenditures in connection with ballot measure campaigns
in Montana. Although a federal district court found the Montana ini-
tiative to be unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has not yet
permitted such regulation of speech on ballot measure campaigns, the
Austin theory of corporate corruption of the political marketplace log-
ically applies just as readily to ballot measure campaigns as it does to
candidate campaigns.
Montana's attempt to broaden Austin to include ballot measure
campaigns emphasizes the urgency of the need to reconsider Austin.
The Supreme Court should not extend Austin to ballot issue cam-
paigns because it is bad law and bad policy. As demonstrated above,
262. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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the segregated fund requirement for corporations is in fact unconstitu-
tional because the alleged state interest is poorly defined, and the seg-
regated fund requirement is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest. An extension of Austin to ballot issue cam-
paigns would seriously undermine the democratic process by firmly
and unconstitutionally reinforcing Austin's flaws in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
The best course for the Court, therefore, is to reconsider the Aus-
tin theory of corporate corruption of the political marketplace with
respect to both candidate and ballot issue campaigns. The Court
should return to Bellotti's framing of the issue, and develop a test for
corruption based on convincing evidence that well-financed voices are
"overwhelming or even significant in influencing" political discourse
and that this threatens "the confidence of the citizenry in govern-
ment. ' 263 The test established by the Court must make clear that it is
not just corporate voices that can dominate political discourse to the
detriment of other points of view, but any voice, individual or organi-
zational, that can spend practically unlimited funds to promote its po-
litical position. The Court must also give some guidance on how such
corruption can be proved. This approach may well require the Court
to reject its holding in Buckley that independent expenditures may not
be regulated,2 4 but there are worse things than recognizing and cor-
recting past mistakes, especially when such mistakes perpetuate and
extend precedents that unconstitutionally curtail First Amendment
rights.
263. 435 U.S. at 789-90.
264. See Nixon, 120 S.Ct. at 916 (arguing that Congress should be allowed to regulate
both expenditures and contributions, but recognizing that because of Buckley, "there are
serious constitutional questions to be confronted in enacting any such scheme.").
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